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North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. 
policy in Northeast Asia.  Because of North Korea’s record of state-sponsored terrorism, 
illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of 
operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing.  Although most agree that North Korea 
should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a simple solution.  This thesis evaluates 
three U.S. policy options for the North Korean nuclear crisis: incentive-based diplomacy, 
coercive diplomacy, or military force.  It analyzes them according to four criteria: the 
impact on North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and 
South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation.  This thesis 
shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons.  First, neither 
the United States nor North Korea trust one another following decades of aggression and 
the demise of the 1994 Agreed Framework.  Second, Kim Jong-il will not permit the 
extensive inspections that the United States demands to increase transparency.  Third, 
multilateral coercive diplomacy is difficult, time-consuming, and not supported by 
Washington’s regional partners.  Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage’s question must be answered: “What price is the United States willing to pay to 
disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?”  If Washington is not willing to follow through 
with the threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy.  Likewise, U.S. 
leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating 
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Reiss, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies, December 2003), 6. 
2 George Bush, “Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” speech 
delivered to National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 11 February 2004, 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
North Korea has been a vexing U.S. foreign policy problem since 1950.  
Pyongyang has sought to develop a nuclear capability for over forty years and in 
September 2003 declared its possession of nuclear weapons.1  The current crisis can trace 
its roots to five distinct events: President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” comment in his 2002 
State of the Union address, the new U.S. National Security Strategy, the U.S. global war 
on terrorism, the demise of the Agreed Framework, and North Korea’s revelation of its 
possession of nuclear weapons.  In February 2004, President Bush described the 
situation: 
In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-range 
ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons, and now 
threatens to build more.  Together with our partners in Asia, America is 
insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and irreversibly 
dismantle its nuclear programs.2 
A typical policy debate proceeds with a claim that North Korea’s latest game of 
brinkmanship is just another attempt to gain aid for bad behavior, and that there should be 
no more deals with North Korea.  Opponents of taking a hard line with North Korea 
highlight U.S. failures to comply with portions of the 1994 Agreed Framework and to the 
unimaginable devastation that a second Korean war could cause.  While most agree on 
the desire for a nuclear free North Korea, no one has a simple solution.   
There are four general policy options available to the United States: incentive-
based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, military force, or acceptance of a nuclear North 
Korea.  What is the best U.S. policy option to achieve our objectives?  Diplomacy is the 
first step toward conflict resolution, and its success would eliminate the need for more 
aggressive policies that could lead to war.  But, is a diplomatic solution possible for such 
a difficult issue, especially when neither party appears willing to compromise?  In light of 
                                                 
1 Stephen Kim, “North Korea” in Proliferation Challenges After Iraq.  ed. Robert Litwak and Mitchell 
President Bush’s February remarks, the assumption is that America will not accept a 
nuclear-armed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).  Accordingly, this thesis 
compares and contrasts the remaining three policy options with respect to four evaluation 
criteria and evaluates each policy’s chance for success.    
Incentive based diplomacy, such as security guarantees or energy and economic 
aid in exchange for nuclear disarmament without a threat of force, will most likely fail to 
remove North Korean nuclear weapons completely, verifiably, and irreversibly.  
Although relatively inexpensive and enthusiastically supported by regional partners, it 
will fail for three key reasons.  First, U.S. reluctance to pursue another incentive-only 
type policy following the demise of the 1994 Agreed Framework may remove this policy 
option even prior to opening dialogue.  Second, North Korea has repeatedly refused to 
allow high levels of transparency as required by any future diplomatic policy options.  
Finally, North Korea’s tough negotiating tactics indicate a reluctance to accept an offer 
without pushing for more concessions, especially absent any threat of negative 
repercussions for non-compliance.   
Next along the spectrum of conflict resolution comes coercive diplomacy, such as 
threatening North Korea with economic sanctions or military force unless it surrenders its 
nuclear weapons program by a certain deadline.  But, coercive diplomacy’s track record 
of success and its prospects for North Korea are bleak.  Similar to an incentive based 
policy, transparency and its requisite verification regime are problematic for North 
Korea.  In addition, U.S. coercive diplomacy has a low success rate and is more difficult 
to execute successfully in a multilateral environment.3  Finally, North Korean leaders are 
able to insulate themselves from the desired effects of coercion.  Failure is virtually 
guaranteed unless properly targeted carrots are offered.     
A second Korean war could be won by Combined Forces Command (CFC) that 
would provide the highest level of control over North Korean nuclear weapons; however, 
its costs are excessive and U.S regional partners oppose the use of force to resolve the 
crisis.  Seoul and Tokyo are immediately at risk to North Korean artillery and ballistic  
2 
                                                 
3 Alexander L. George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 7.   
missiles, respectively.  The American public does not perceive a significantly high 
enough threat from North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons to spend billions and 
endure military losses in the tens of thousands.4     
Delays in disarming North Korea’s nuclear weapons provide its leaders time to 
increase their stockpile. It is time for the six party talks to produce tangible results.  If 
not, the United States needs to apply just enough stick to convince North Korean leaders 
that the carrots being offered are more palatable than a sledgehammer.  Presented with 
the examples of Libya or Iraq, which policy option would North Korea prefer?  Is this a 
valid comparison or are the strategic situations radically different?  Should coercion fail, 
the United States must be ready to follow through on its threat of military action to 
disarm North Korea of its nuclear weapons completely.   
A. THE EPICENTER OF NORTHEAST ASIA 
 The Korean Peninsula is the geopolitical epicenter of Asia.  Five of the top 
fourteen economic powers and four of the ten largest armies in the world are within 600 
miles of each other.  Seoul and Pyongyang are 111 nautical miles apart, separated by the 
most heavily armed area on the planet.5  The Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) divides 
two countries that are not at peace, but rather co-exist under a 1953 armistice that has 
witnessed thousands of violations and hundreds of deaths.  Like other epicenters, Korea 
rumbles periodically: the 1968 USS Pueblo seizure, the 1994 nuclear crisis, and the 
DPRK’s recent declaration that it possesses nuclear weapons all sent shockwaves through 
the region.  The magnitude of the fault lines linking the United States, China, North 
Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia are enormous and span political, cultural, 
economic, and military categories.  Note the sizable differences in gross domestic 





                                                 
4 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 315. 
5 Congress, House, Asia-Pacific Subcommittee on International Relations, testimony by Admiral 
Fargo, Commander Pacific Command, 26 June 2003. 
4 
Government Printing Office, January 2001), 7, www.defenselink.mil. (accessed April 2004). 
8 Mr. Shingo Nishimua, interview by Eric Weiner (07 March 2003), National Public Radio Transcript. 
9 Proliferation: Threat and Response, 11. 
Table 1. Selected Comparison of the Six-Party Talk Countries.6   
 
USA 10.1 T 1 3.10% 1,396,200 276.7B 3.20% 288.3 M
China 5.7 T 2 9.40% 2,200,000 55.9B 4.30% 1.28 B
Japan 3.2 T 3 6.80% 234,000 39.5 B 1.00% 127.1 M
DPRK 22 B 99 # 1,173,000 5.2B 11 - 33.9%  ^ 22.5 M
ROK 784 B 14 10.30% 672,000 13.1B 2.80% 47.6 M

















PPP GDP = Purchasing Power Parity Gross Domestic Product
? = Unknown  : NA = Not available
# = Negative Growth 9 years from1990 - 1998, positive since 1999 approx 1% each yr
* = Soviet Troop Strength includes Strategic Rocket Forces
^ = low of 11% (’03 Janes North Korea country profile)  to a high of 33.9% (CIA worldfactbook ’03)  
 
U.S. vital interests in the region include 500,000 citizens, 100,000 troops, and 
$500 billion in annual trade.7  Maintaining security and stability is paramount to U.S., 
Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese interests.  However, regional stability continues to 
be problematic.   
One example of instability in the region is North Korea’s relations with Japan.  
Japan’s brutal colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945 left indelible marks on Korean 
society.  North Korea’s extensive methamphetamine trafficking and its acknowledgement 
that it kidnapped Japanese citizens for two decades heightened an already troubled 
relationship.  Pyongyang is 700 nautical miles from Tokyo -- mere minutes of missile 
flight time.  North Korea’s proximity to Japan provides opportunity, its missiles provide a 
threat, and its public statements display hostile intent.  North Korea’s threat to turn Tokyo 
into a “sea of fire” caused Japanese Diet Member Mr. Shingo Nishimura to comment: 
“there is no bigger threat than that.”8  With hundreds of missiles, including No Dong 
missiles with an 800-mile range, North Korea can strike all countries in Northeast Asia.9  
In addition, North Korea’s September 1998 Taepo Dong I test demonstrated over 1,000 
                                                 
6www.worldbank.org, www.cia.gov/publications/factbook, www.4Janes.com, and NS4207 class notes 
of Professor Kim Deok Yeong, visiting Professor from the Korean National Defense University.   
7 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
5 
action versus inaction comes from the National Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
December 2002, p. 1.  President Bush’s distaste for Kim Jong-il was reported by Washington Post’s Bob 
Woodward from a summer 2002 interview quoted in The CQ Researcher, 13, no. 14, (11 April 2003), 324. 
12 George Bush, speech to NDU, 11 February 2004.   
mile range along with multi-stage missile capability.10  Japan showed considerable 
restraint following the missile test, but Northeast Asia is rumbling again following the 
complete breakdown of the Agreed Framework, the new U.S. National Security Policy, 
and North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).   
B. ASSUMPTIONS  
What are U.S. policy goals and constraints?  The United States is committed to 
preventing Kim Jong-il from using, threatening to use, or selling nuclear weapons.  In 
accomplishing this objective, U.S. policy options are constrained by key regional 
partners.  For example, U.S. State Department officials refer to the three “No’s” that 
China and the United States agreed upon with respect to common goals for North Korea: 
no nuclear weapons, no war, no collapse.  In developing alternative strategies for 
resolving the current crisis, however, strategists should not rule out any policy option 
prior to submission for debate, selection, and approval.  In addition, if the United States 
will not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea and diplomacy ultimately fails, how should 
the United States proceed?  For these reasons, it is essential to consider military force.  
The basis for eliminating accepting North Korean nuclear weapons as a policy option are 
President Bush’s numerous statements reflecting his desire to protect the United States 
from the Axis of Evil, his policy preference for action versus inaction, and his personal 
distaste for Kim Jong-il.11   
1. Policy Goals 
U.S. policy objectives for North Korean nuclear weapons include complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament.12  At the heart of any solution will be a 
verification mechanism that must meet the requirements of the United States, North 
Korea, and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).  But, North Korea’s 
difficulty in accepting even low levels of transparency was apparent in its April 2004 
handling of the train disaster near Ryongchon.  With its self-reliance ideology known as 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 The Axis of Evil reference occurred in the 2002 State of the Union address.  Policy Preference for 
juche, North Korea has several reasons for remaining isolated.  When negotiating with 
North Korea, one must not forget the country’s outrageous track record of violating 
international norms.  Consider the following short list: 
• 1968 Seizure of USS Pueblo, held the crew of 82 for 11 months; 
• Three assassination attempts on South Korean Presidents (’68, ’74, ’83); 
• November 1987 bombing of KAL flight 858, killing 115 innocent people; 
• 1976, Two U.S. Officers clubbed to death in DMZ tree cutting detail; 
• 2001, DPRK sold approximately $580 million worth of ballistic missiles 
to the Middle East alone;13 
• Although no evidence of selling WMD, DPRK sold ballistic missiles to 
Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen;14 
• 2002, DPRK admitted to kidnapping Japanese citizens in the 1970’s-
1980’s; 
• Since 1976, trafficking narcotics, other criminal activity, and passing 
counterfeit U.S. notes resulted in the apprehension of DPRK official over 
50 times in 20 countries.15 
The United States cannot permit a country with North Korea’s record of state-
sponsored terrorism, human rights violations, and arms sales to possess and threaten the 
use or sale of nuclear weapons.   
Why did North Korea toil for four decades to develop nuclear weapons?  Some 
strategists argue that in order to formulate precise policy, it is necessary to understand 
North Korea’s motivation for building nuclear weapons.  Blackmail, black-market, 
deterrence, or detonation is an easy memory aid to describe four potential explanations.  
North Korea may intend to blackmail the United States into providing security 
guarantees, humanitarian aid, or energy assistance by threatening to detonate or sell its 
nuclear weapons.  North Korea’s foremost policy goal is regime survival.  Accordingly,  
                                                 
13 Stephen Kim, “North Korea,” 7. 
14 Mary H. Cooper, “North Korean Crisis,” The CQ Researcher (11 April 2003). 333. 
6 
15 Congress, Senate. Governmental affairs subcommittee on Financial Management and the Budget 
and International Security. Testimony by William Bach, Department of State, Director, Office of African, 
Asian and European Affairs Bureau.  (22 May 2003), usembassy.state.gov/posts/pk1/wwwho3052208.html. 
(accessed April 2004). 
the most logical explanation for its pursuit of nuclear weapons is to deter what it 
perceives to be a U.S. desire to overthrow its government with military force.  The risk of 
selling or using its nuclear weapons is what spurs the United States into action.     
2. Constraints 
In light of blowback from perceived U.S. unilateral action in Iraq and the vital 
interests of regional partners, the United States must follow a multilateral approach in its 
conduct of Northeast Asia policy.  The United States cannot afford to alienate China 
while attempting to coerce North Korea.  From a pragmatic standpoint, China’s military 
and economic strength poses a significant obstacle if it disagrees with U.S. policy.  In 
fact, China is in a position to help.  China’s significant leverage over North Korea stems 
from its coal and oil exports which comprise approximately 80 percent of North Korea’s 
energy resources.16   
North Korea’s military forces and ballistic missiles also hold major South Korean 
and Japanese cities at risk.  Seoul’s metropolitan area of over 19 million is well within 
range of thousands of artillery pieces and Tokyo’s metropolitan area of 31 million has 
been threatened by North Korean rhetoric (e.g., the “sea of fire” remark) and military 
capabilities (e.g. the 1998 Taepo Dong I missile test over Japan).  South Korea’s 
partnership with the United States has long been viewed as the center of gravity.  North 
Korea intends to divide and the United States struggles to maintain the Washington – 
Seoul partnership.  The January 1998 inauguration of former South Korean President 
Kim Dae Jung limited the U.S. policy options.  Kim’s Sunshine Policy encouraged 
dialogue, reconciliation, and confidence building between the two Koreas.  South Korea’s 
current president, Roh Moo-hyun, met with President Bush in May 2003, and their very 
limited “agreement on further steps” to resolve the nuclear crisis had the roar of a 
butterfly.  Finally, although President Bush enjoyed an approval-rating surge for firm 
leadership following the attacks of 11 September 2001, he is constrained by 2004 
reelection concerns and questions regarding pre-war intelligence on Iraq in pursuing a 
more vigorous policy against Pyongyang.   
7 
 
                                                 
16 Stephen Kim, “North Korea,” 8. 
C. MEASURES OF POLICY COMPARISON 
To compare and contrast policy options, four selected criteria will measure the 
impact of U.S. policy choices: nuclear weapons, neighbors, price, and precedent. 
1. Impact on North Korean Nuclear Weapons 
Because U.S. policy seeks to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible North 
Korean nuclear disarmament, the first and foremost consideration is how policy impacts 
the status of current North Korean nuclear weapons and the country’s capability to 
develop future nuclear weapons.  This includes not only North Korea’s already 
acknowledged plutonium production, but also its currently disavowed highly enriched 
uranium path to nuclear weapons.  The first step is full disclosure while freezing 
production, followed by verification, and then ultimately dismantling any current 
weapons. 
2. Impact on North Korean Neighbors 
Since U.S. policy options will be constrained by the proximity to and strength of 
North Korea’s neighbors, it is necessary to analyze the impact of each policy on its 
neighbors:  China, Japan, and South Korea.  Russia’s relatively minimal role and limited 
ability to leverage North Korea’s actions marginalizes its impact on the crisis.17   
3. Policy Costs 
As with any U.S. policy, the President is ultimately responsible for explaining the 
cost of his choices to American taxpayers.  Costs will not only be measured in treasure, 
but also in the potential loss of life.  Lives will be lost most obviously in a second Korean 
War scenario; however, coercive diplomacy such as economic sanctions also can lead to 
civilian casualties.  One coercive policy implementation problem in North Korea is the 
leadership’s ability and willingness to insulate themselves from the effects of sanctions.  
Finally, risk analysis is a paramount consideration in policy selection.  North Korea has 
repeatedly threatened a military response to either United Nations’ Security Council 
resolutions or economic sanctions.  Furthermore, the United States cannot sit idly while 
North Korea develops nuclear weapons due to the high risk of resulting nuclear 
proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
8 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 7. 
4. Precedent 
How the world resolves the current North Korean nuclear crisis will affect future 
nuclear proliferation cases.  Nuclear nonproliferation has been an objective of the United 
States and the United Nations since the development of nuclear weapons.  On 5 March 
1970, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) codified international support for halting 
the spread of nuclear weapons.  The NPT regime has had numerous successes such as 
South Africa and Ukraine, but it has no answer for non-signatory countries that have 
developed nuclear weapons such as India, Pakistan, and Israel.  North Korea is what 
former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to as, “the poster-child of 
proliferation problems.”18  Forced to enter the NPT in December 1985 by the Soviet 
Union, North Korea threatened to withdraw in March 1993.  North Korea’s second threat 
to withdraw actually became effective on 10 April 2003, after it kicked out International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and was the first country to ever deny IAEA 
requests for special inspections.19   
D. SPECTRUM OF INTEREST AND POLICY 
For most situations, there is a spectrum of a country’s interest, influence, and 

















































Figure 1.   Spectrum of Interest and Policy Tools 
 
From this spectrum, coercive diplomacy is the most relevant in helping to explain 
the formulation of U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons.  North Korean 
nuclear weapons development is the act that has occurred and President Bush has stated 
                                                 
18 William J. Perry, “North Korea: The Real Nuclear Crisis,” Speech at Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  (16 December 2003). 
19 This fact is not meant to be overly incriminating.  North Korea was the first country that the IAEA 
demanded to submit to special inspections.   
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America’s interest in reversing this action.  Although some may perceive that U.S. 
diplomacy with respect to North Korea is inherently coercive due to the 37,000 U.S. 
troops in South Korea, these forces are in place to help deter a North Korea attack and 
should deterrence fail, to defeat North Korean aggression.  Beyond its deterrence 
mission, the United States may soon threaten or actually use military force as part of a 
coercive diplomatic policy to resolve the nuclear crisis.   
E. ROADMAP 
This introduction explains why security in Northeast Asia is paramount to U.S. 
interests, what assumptions were made, why the author selected four specific criteria for 
evaluation.  The core of this thesis is the analysis of three policy options when compared 
to four evaluation criteria and each policy’s chance for success.  The analysis of each 
policy option forms its own chapter, with each chapter organized in the same fashion: an 
overview, analysis of the policy on each of the four criteria, and a summary.   
Chapter II analyzes an incentive-based policy, referred to as “the carrot.”  It also 
reviews the 1994 nuclear crisis and the implications for future incentive-based policies.  
Due to the demise of the Agreed Framework, North Korea’s previous difficulty in 
agreeing to inspection formats, and its negotiating tactic of maximum gain for minimum 
concessions, it is unlikely that incentives alone will buy North Korean nuclear 
disarmament.  
Chapter III analyzes a coercive diplomatic solution known as “the stick.”  It also 
reviews U.S. policy development during the 1994 nuclear crisis and the debate over Kim 
Jong-il’s rationality.  Although capable of analyzing the costs and benefits of various 
options, Kim Jong-il remains reluctant to permit transparency into North Korea and has 
the ability to isolate himself and his support base from economic strangulation.  When 
combined with the low success rate and difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive 
diplomacy, the prospects for coercion are slim.   
Chapter IV reviews the advantages and disadvantages of using military force to 
rid North Korea of nuclear weapons and the prospects for this policy option.  Regardless 
10 
of who wins the debate on how widespread damage to Korea’s infrastructure or how high  
the loss of life will be, a second Korean war is not currently diplomatically or politically 
feasible.  Ironically, although it has the greatest ability to disarm North Korean nuclear 
weapons, it has the least regional support. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter V’s summary of findings and policy 
recommendations.  For a variety of reasons, neither incentive-based nor coercive 
diplomacy will cause North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons program.
Furthermore, military force is currently untenable.  The best option is to convince North 
Korea that the Libyan model is better than the Iraqi model, in that it offers Pyongyang 
otherwise impossible security guarantees, regime survival, and improved economic and 
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II. THE CARROT 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of an incentive-based 
U.S. policy for meeting the North Korean nuclear challenge and evaluates its chance for 
success.  Although an incentive-based policy is both relatively inexpensive and favored 
by key regional partners, such as South Korea and China, it is unlikely to succeed.  The 
United States government fundamentally mistrusts North Korea.  Consider the high level 
of mistrust evident in Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s remark: 
We tried the bilateral approach 10 years ago, by negotiating the Agreed 
Framework…and we found the North could not be trusted.  This time, a 
new and more comprehensive approach is required.20  
A potential U.S. incentive-based policy could promise not to attack the DPRK in 
addition to providing energy and food aid in exchange for verifiable nuclear 
disarmament.  However, the resolution of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis resulted 
from this incentive-type approach, and Secretary Kelly’s comment is an indicator of one 
of three reasons that this type of policy approach is likely to fail.  First, the current U.S. 
administration appears reluctant to give North Korea a second chance after feeling burned 
by the DPRK’s secret pursuit of the highly enriched uranium path to nuclear weapons 
while under the 1994 Agreed Framework.  Second, North Korea has repeatedly balked at 
various inspection regimes.  The DPRK failed to agree to an inspection protocol under 
the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), refused to allow IAEA special 
inspections, and is opposed to increased levels of transparency.  Finally, experts believe 
that without some real threat, North Korea will not voluntarily concede anything.  Former 
Special Assistant to the President Daniel Poneman passed on given advice. 
One of the first things told me by somebody older and wiser than I about 
dealing with North Korea back in the early 1990s was that North Korea 
does not respond to pressure, but without pressure they do not respond.21 
13 
                                                 
20 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Testimony (12 March 2003), as quoted by Mary H. Cooper in “North Korean 
Crisis,” The CQ Researcher, (16 November 2001), 327. 
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reported.  See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 
2001), 326. 
23 Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of 
Adversaries,” Comparative Strategy 22 (December 2003), 471. 
This manifests itself in North Korea’s hard-line negotiating tactics, which 
consistently push for maximizing gains while minimizing concessions.  This negotiating 
strategy is not unique to North Korea, but the DPRK’s willingness to accept high levels 
of risk by using brinkmanship demonstrates a uniquely hard-line approach to 
international relations.     
B. BACKGROUND 
1. The Agreed Framework 
In June 1994, tensions escalated to what former Secretary of Defense Ashton 
Carter called the biggest nuclear crisis since the Cuban Missile Crisis.  That same month, 
while President Clinton met with National Security Council principals to receive military 
strike briefings and while General Luck was making emergency evacuation plans for 
80,000 noncombatants from South Korea, former President Carter called the White 
House with a possible solution.22  Flying to Pyongyang, he secured a peaceful resolution 
not as an official envoy of the United States, but as a concerned citizen.  The Agreed 
Framework negotiations survived the July 1994 death of the Great Leader, Kim-il Sung, 
and the document was signed on 21 October 1994.  Alexander George cited the Agreed 
Framework as an example of “conditional reciprocity” to achieve a lesser objective of 
policy modification versus regime behavioral modification.23  In other words, the United 
States attempted to change DPRK nuclear policies by offering incentives that could meet 
the country’s energy needs.  Among several stipulations, North Korea agreed to comply 
with nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) required safeguards and to allow IAEA 
inspectors to visit Yongbyon’s nuclear facilities.   
 
                                                 
21  “Nuclear Confrontation with North Korea: Lessons of the 1994 Crisis for Today,” Daniel Poneman, 
former Special Assistant to the President of the United States for Nonproliferation and Export Control 
Policy.  Remarks made during a Nautilus Seminar (20 March 2003), 
www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreedFramework/1994Crisis.html (accessed April 2004). 
22 While the military strike briefings were widely reported, the fact that the commander of U.S. Forces 
Korea, General Luck, was preparing for a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) was not widely 
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ISIS Reports, 2000), 44. 
26 Ibid. 
27 U.S. State Department officials interview by the author, Washington, D.C., 25 August 2003. 
Those who argue against providing North Korea incentives to halt its nuclear 
ambitions claim that the 1994 Agreed Framework failed.  North Korea promised to freeze 
its plutonium production at Yongbyon and Taechon in exchange for two light-water 
nuclear reactors and 500,000 tons of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) per year until the first reactor 
was operational.24  Not only did North Korea recently declare the Agreed Framework 
null and void, but also withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and expelled 
IAEA inspectors.  However, there are two sides to every story.  The execution phase of 
the Agreed Framework proved much more difficult than the drafting phase.  Both the 
United States and North Korea created obstacles to the timely completion of key tasks.  
The United States overestimated potential contributions from member countries (Japan 
and South Korea) of the newly created consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO), and underestimated the costs of procurement.25  
The book by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Solving the North 
Korean Nuclear Puzzle, summarized U.S. excuses for delays of HFO shipments: 
The United States first overestimated the potential contributions to be 
received from member countries and then underestimated the costs of 
procurement and delivery, thereby underestimating the amount needed 
from Congress… Thus, deliveries of HFO have often slipped to the point 
that the United States was technically in violation of the Agreed 
Framework.26 
U.S. State Department officials counter North Korea’s accusations by explaining 
that during low-level detailed negotiations, North Korea repeatedly asked for more than 
what the Agreed Framework provided, and these numerous demands significantly 
delayed the delivery of goods.  Examples ranged from intentionally delaying South 
Korean construction workers’ visas to seeking comparable pay and housing standards for 
North Korean construction workers.27  If the DPRK did not possess nuclear weapons in 
                                                 
24 For details of the Agreed Framework, refer to Appendix B.  In addition, refer to Richard Armitage, 
“A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea by Richard Armitage,” in Solving the North Korean Nuclear 
Puzzle, ed. David Albright and Kevin O’Neill (Washington, D.C.: (ISIS Reports, 2000), 315. 
25 David Albright and Kevin O’Neill.  Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.  (Washington, D.C.: 
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(accessed April 2004). 
29 Dr. Han, a professor at the Korea National Defense University, was a senior South Korean staff 
member who participated in the JNCC, a Principal Assistant to the Korean Minister of Defense in 1993, 
and a visiting fellow to the RAND Corporation. 
1994 and it does now, did the diplomatic solution of nine years ago fail?  Several experts 
claim that the Agreed Framework verifiably froze plutonium weapons production 
capability and thus bought the United States time.  Experts argue that the United States 
accepted the risk of North Korea cheating under the Agreed Framework in exchange for 
slowing the pace of weapons development.  It has also been argued that acceptance of 
this solution was influenced by the administration’s prevailing belief that North Korea’s 
communist dictatorship would suffer economic collapse.  David Albright, President of 
ISIS, stated the following: 
The Agreed Framework does not solve the basic verification problem.  
When it was signed in 1994, the United States said that inspections would 
start in five years.  Those five years have come and gone, and it may still 
be another four years before inspections start.  For these reasons, we 
remain concerned about the lack of transparency of the North Korean 
nuclear program.28   
The Agreed Framework was the best of only bad options available at the time.  
Moreover, although, it secured a tactical victory (freeze plutonium production) with 
legalistic compliance, it was a strategic failure since North Korea’s pursuit of highly 
enriched uranium violated the “spirit and intent” of the agreement’s premise: preventing a 
nuclear-armed North Korea by offering energy alternatives.   
2. North Korean Negotiating Tactics 
Dr. Yong-Sup Han’s research of North Korean negotiating tactics yielded several 
findings.29  First, North Korea employed different tactics with South Korea than it did 
with the United States.  Second, North Korea used brinkmanship (creating a crisis) to 
bring the United States to the negotiating table.  Third, once at the table, North Korea 
sought to expand the negotiation’s scope to include other items such as normalizing 
relations with the United States.  As Dr. Han noted, “North Korea again pursued a 
                                                 
28 David Albright, 2001 speech “Ensuring Nuclear Transparency on the Korean Peninsula: What is an 
Adequate Approach?” 59. www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/monitoringVerification/index.html. 
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30 Yong-Sup Han, “North Korean Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations,” The Nonproliferation Review 7, 
no. 1 (Spring 2000): 51. 
31 Ibid., 53. 
strategy of maximizing gains while minimizing concessions.”30  He explained that North 
Korea subdivided issues to exploit every possible piece of the negotiations to achieve 
maximum gains from the United States.  Unique to negotiations with the United States, 
North Korea feigned an internal struggle between diplomats and hard-line military 
leaders to explain the reason for not pushing North Korean diplomats too hard for 
concessions as their removal from any negotiations was possible.  Finally, his article 
concluded with policy implications that urged a balanced “carrot and stick” approach to 
North Korea.  He argued that in order to correct North Korea’s misperception that 
brinkmanship will benefit its position, “the United States needs to design more effective 
and varied sticks.”31 
3. More of the Same? 
Contentious comparisons are often made between the 1994 crisis and the current 
crisis.  Is the current crisis similar to the 1994 crisis?  The answer is not simply yes or no, 
but rather a little yes mixed with mostly no.  There are tremendous differences in 
leadership, economic situations, North Korean nuclear weapons status, and regional 
influences.  The U.S. global war on terrorism is an additional factor that separates the two 
situations. 
The leaders of every country involved in the six-party talks were new to nuclear 
negotiations, and most were relatively new leaders of their respective countries.  
Negotiations over the Agreed Framework survived the July 1994 death of “the Great 
Leader,” Kim il-Sung, and after a few years, his son, Kim Jong-il, consolidated his 
powerbase and became known as “the Dear Leader.”  Hu Jintao was elected president of 
China on 15 March 2003, only one month prior to Beijing hosting three-party talks and 
six months prior to hosting the six-party talks.  There have been six Japanese Prime 
Ministers since the 1994 nuclear crisis.  The current Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
enjoyed widespread support when he took office in 2001, but now faces criticism for a 
sluggish economy.  U.S. President George Bush took office in January of 2001 and soon 
faced the challenges created by the attacks on 11 September 2001.  South Korean 
President Roh took office on 25 February 2003 with gifts from North Korea that included 
two anti-ship missile firings, an airspace violation, and the announcement that the DPRK 
had restarted its 5MW reactor!32  Furthermore, he was recently distracted by a 
presidential impeachment process; a case that was ultimately dismissed by South Korean
courts. 
The economic situation in Asia is different following the economic crisis of 1997-
98.  North Korea’s failing economy was predicted to collapse shortly after the floods of 
the 1990s and was reported to be a consideration for the choice of a diplomatic solution 
based upon the belief that the country would collapse internally prior to developing 
nuclear weapons.  The impact of economic trade in the region can hardly be understated. 
North Korea has a desperate need for hard currency, food, and energy.  Japan has 
publicly tied any future North Korean assistance to nuclear concessions and resolution of 
the abductees issue, while other countries such as China have continued to trade with 
North Korea due to potential economic gains and possibly to stave off the chaos of a 
 
 
North Korean collapse.  
North Korea most likely did not possess nuclear weapons deliverable by missile 
in 1994.  Recently, unclassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports and 
Congressional testimony claim that North Korea most likely already possesses one or two 
nuclear weapons.33  In addition, it is no longer possible to confirm the status of some of 
the 8,000 spent fuel rods previously under IAEA monitoring.  Using these fuel rods, 
North Korea may be able to produce several more nuclear weapons quickly.  Beyond the 
plutonium path, North Korea’s pursuit of highly enriched uranium, and its now publicly 
revealed ties to Pakistan nuclear technology via A.Q. Khan’s international nuclear black-
market, increase the urgency of finding an acceptable solution. 
 
                                                 
32 See Appendix A during February 2003, the term gifts jokingly refers to events such as missile test 
firings and other provocative actions North Korean does to embarrass South Korea.      
33 David A. Albright, “North Korea’s Current and Future Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Stocks,” 
ISIS Brief (15 January 2003), www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/currentandfutureweaponsstocks.html. 
(accessed April 2004). 
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 Jim Yardley, “Kim in Beijing but Nowhere to be Seen,” New York Times (21 April 2004). 
35 Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, (New York: Brookings, 
2003), 33. Kim Jong-il last seen 12 February 2003 meeting with visiting Russian dignitaries and not seen 
again in public until a 3 April 2003 military ceremony.  U.S. operations began in Iraq on 20 March 2003.   
The influence of regional powers also has changed.  The collapse of the Soviet 
Union ended its ability to support North Korea economically.  Some argue that Russia is 
seeking to improve relations with North Korea due to economic gains from increased 
arms-sale markets.  China has shown a greater interest in resolving the tension peacefully 
as demonstrated by its decision to host the six-party talks in Beijing.  In the past, U.S. 
requests for China’s support and involvement in resolving the conflict were coolly 
received.  Kim Jong-il’s hushed visit to Beijing followed shortly after Vice President 
Cheney’s April 2004 visit to China.  Leaked only to South Korean journalists, there were 
reports that Beijing was relating to North Korea an increased sense of urgency to resolve 
the nuclear issue.34  North Korea’s 1998 missile test over Japan frightened the country 
into launching two reconnaissance satellites, and for the first time publicly, Diet members 
discussed increased security to include possible nuclear weapons.  Two men defused the 
1994 crisis: former U.S. President Carter and Kim il-Sung.  In contrast, the current 
multilateral diplomatic path significantly complicates negotiations.   
Although controversial, U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq sent a clear 
message to Kim Jong-il.  In fact, the message was so clear the dictator went into hiding 
for approximately 48 days around the start of U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom.35  
Experts have proposed that North Korea learned two important lessons from U.S. policy 
toward Iraq.  First, North Korea may have determined after the first Gulf War that 
allowing United Nations inspections simply permits the collection of evidence that will 
lead to further military intervention.  Second, North Korea may believe that chemical 
weapons will not deter U.S. military action; only nuclear weapons will effectively stop 
U.S. military action in the Korean peninsula.  There are several possible motivations for 
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons: prestige, blackmail, or military use, but a 
leading theory is to deter a U.S. invasion.  The irony lies in the fact that North Korean  
                                                 
34
nuclear weapons development may be the tripwire that causes what North Korea hopes to 
avoid.  Although there are numerous differences, issues such as mistrust, incompatible 
policy objectives, and fear of North Korean collapse remain in the current crisis.   
Critics of the 1994 Agreed Framework point to North Korea’s pursuit of highly 
enriched uranium based weapons.  Supporters of the policy argue that it “bought the 
United States time” by delaying North Korean plutonium production capabilities.  During 
an August 2003 lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, former CIA Director James 
associated with a North Korean collapse.  Although economic studies differ on South 
Korea’s cost for peaceful reunification with the North, estimates, measured in the  
                                                
Woolsey clearly articulated his position by stating, “any agreement with North Korea is 
worse than worthless.”36  This attitude appears common enough among diplomats in 
Washington to create intense policy debate, but it remains in the shadows of U.S. policy 
in Iraq. 
U.S. policy objectives for North Korean nuclear weapons include verifiable 
nuclear disarmament and cessation of all efforts to procure nuclear weapons.  North 
Korea seeks security guarantees from the United States and has previously opposed 
comprehensive inspections for fear of revealing the status of not only their nuclear 
capabilities, but also their conventional and chemical weapons status.  Even if North 
Korea is willing to trade away future nuclear weapons production capability, it will most 
likely demand additional incentives for weapons surrendered or worse to “grandfather” 
current weapons.  Referring to these types of demands, President Bush commented, 
“What this country won’t do is be blackmailed.”37   
China and South Korea fear a refugee problem and the negative economic effect 
 
36 James Woolsey, remarks during speech given as part of Secretary of the Navy, Guest Lecture 
Series, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 21 August 2003. 
37 CNN.com. (accessed December 2003). 
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hundreds of billions, show a high of $1.7 trillion.38  In addition, China views its smaller 
under the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), and one via a United Nations 
inspection vehicle, the IAEA--the prospect of successfully building an inspection 
mechanism appears bleak.   
1.  The IAEA: Objective Organization or U.S. Coercion Tool? 
Created in 1957 as the “Atoms for Peace” Agency, the IAEA is, “an independent 
intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, in the United Nations, 
that serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation.”39  The IAEA has 137 
member states, an annual budget of approximately $268 million, and is headquartered in 
Vienna, Austria. The 35-member Board of Governors and the General Conference 
determine IAEA policies with reports submitted to both the U.N. Security Council and 
General Assembly.40   
                                                
communist neighbor as a nice security buffer to both U.S. forces and South Korea’s 
market economy.   
C. IMPACT ON NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
For the United States to understand the impact any diplomatic policy will have on 
North Korean nuclear weapons, it must be able to verify compliance by means of an 
agreed inspection regime.  The United States also would need to know the actual status of 
both North Korea’s current nuclear weapons and both forms of fissile material production 
(i.e. plutonium and highly enriched uranium.)  Establishing an agreed upon inspection 
regime to determine the baseline and ensure compliance has proven to be problematic in 
the past.   
North Korea does not view the United Nations as a neutral party since it fought 
the Korean War against United Nations Command and remains obligated to its 1953 
armistice.  Next, considering two previously failed inspection attempts, one inter-Korean 
 
38 Robinson Noland and Li, “The Economics of Korean Reunification,” as found in Susan F. Bryant, 
Beyond the Sunshine Policy: An argument in favor of continued U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia, 
ed. Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 47 (USAF Academy, Colorado Springs: 
November, 2002). 
39 www.iaea.org/about/mission.html. (accessed April 2004). 
40 Ibid. 
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The IAEA interacted with North Korea prior to the DPRK’s joining the NPT on 
12 December 1985.  On 20 July 1977, the IAEA and North Korea completed an 
agreement on safety measures for the IRT research reactor supplied to North Korea by 
the Soviet Union in the 1960s.41  The IAEA underwent significant changes following 
lessons learned from Iraqi inspections and the increased sharing of classified information 
to focus agency inspections on suspect sites.  The United States and other countries 
deemed it prudent to share classified information with the agency and the world to 
establish the necessary global interest, support, and credibility for nonproliferation 
initiatives.  Although receiving classified information from various nations has resulted in 
improved inspections, it came at a cost to the IAEA’s reputation of neutrality.  By sharing 
information, the agency risks losing its reputation as an impartial inspector of 
on three elements of an effective inspection regime: equal number of inspections, no 
sanctuaries, and “challenge” inspections which could be given with a mere 24 hours 
                                                
international norms and may be perceived as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.   
2.  Previous Failed Inspection Attempts 
a. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) 
On 31 December 1991, North and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration 
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  Among its pledges was the promise to 
ban the possession and use of nuclear weapons, nuclear reprocessing, and uranium 
enrichment facilities to include any testing, manufacturing, production storage, or 
deployment of these types of weapons.  These pledges were to be verified by establishing 
the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), responsible for conducting inspections 
of, “particular subjects chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the two 
sides.”42  The JNCC was established in March of 1992, but after optimistic beginnings, it 
failed when both parties could not agree on inspection terms.  The JNCC has not met 
since 1993.  According to Holly Higgins, an ISIS analyst, the JNCC failed due to a lack 
of experience in bilateral inspection negotiations, a lack of trust, and the failure to agree 
 
41 David Albright and Kevin O’Neill,  Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.  (Washington, D.C.: 
ISIS Reports, 2000), 257. 
42 Ibid., 245. 
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notice.43  Dr. Yong-Sup Han concurs that North Korea is reluctant to permit the level of 
transparency requested by South Korea and the United States.  Referring to North 
Korea’s position on challenge inspections, he wrote: 
North Korea remained consistent on the issue of the inspection regime.  
North Korea strongly opposed the concept of intrusive inspection regime 
such as the challenge inspection requested by the South in the inter-
Korean nuclear talks and the special inspections requested by the IAEA.  
North Korea especially disliked inspections of military bases, but it 
demanded inspections of U.S. bases in the South, charging that the United 
States had stationed more than 1,000 nuclear weapons on South Korean 
soil.44  
The JNCC’s f ROK 





within the proscribed 180 days.  The DPRK did not miss the deadline by weeks or 
months, but by nearly six years.  It finally came into full compliance in May of 1992 
when it permitted Hans Blix, then IAEA Director General, and his team to conduct 
inspections of the Yongbyon nuclear research complex.45  When compared with North 
Korean initial disclosure statements, the results of these inspections did not match.  The 
IAEA went through extensive internal debates on North Korea’s required level of 
reporting accuracy and repeatedly requested clarification and updates from North Korea.  
                                                
ailure occurred nearly simultaneously with tension over the U.S.-
exercise Team Spirit and the escalating nuclear crisis, which culminated in 1994.  This 
r start for building trust by means of an inspection regime. 
b. IAEA’s Role in the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
As a result of the North-South impasse, the DPRK announced its intended 
withdrawal from the NPT and sought direct negotiations with the United States.  The 
1994 Crisis had at its core, two major events: North Korea’s failure to resolve 
discrepancies found by IAEA inspections satisfactorily, and the U.S.-ROK Com
ilitary exercise Team Spirit.  In April 1992, North Korea made its initial declaration of 
 to the IAEA and agreed to host inspectors.  Although North Korea joined the
NPT on 12 December 1985, it failed to conclude the required safeguard agreem
 
43 Ibid., 246. 
44 Yong-Sup Han, “North Korean Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations,” The Nonproliferation Review 7, 
no. 1 (Spring 2000): 45. 
45 Albright and O’Neill.  Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle,  9.  
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It was during these back-and-forth communications that the leaders within the IAEA 
began to agree that things did not add up.  Several interactions then occurred between the
IAEA and North Korea: 
• 11-16 May 1992: IAEA inspection at Yongbyon goes well.  DPRK 
releases press statement that essentially states IAEA inspectors ar
welcome anywhere, anytime; 
• Fall 1992: IAEA discovers discrepancies between declared plutonium and 
inspection results; 
• February 1993: IAEA and DPRK are at an impasse over discrepancies; 
• February 1993: IAEA first ever request for “special inspections” in North 
Korea; 
• 12 March 1993:  DPRK notifies both IAEA and UN Security Council of 
its intention to withdraw from the NPT; 
• 11 May 1993: UN Security Council adopts a resolution calling on North 
Korea to honor its nonproliferation obligations and to reconsider.46   
 
e 
North Korea remains the only country to have ever refused IAEA special inspections.  
Based upon these past experiences, both with fellow Koreans and an international 
organization, the chance for future North Korean voluntary cooperation with inspection 
regimes appears slim.   
3. Future Inspection Regimes: How Much Transparency? 
Verification is the crux of any diplomatic solution.  How many and what type of 
inspections to demand is a tightrope balancing act: which regime will achieve enough 
transparency to ensure North Korean compliance without demanding so much that it gets 
nothing.  David Albright, an expert from ISIS, offered the following insights and 
recommendations.  First, the 1994 Agreed Framework did not solve the basic verification 
problem because it gave North Korea five years before inspections were to commence.  
Second, given the tense relationship between the IAEA and North Korea, a parallel 
bilateral U.S.-DPRK inspection mechanism should be established immediately to provide 
feedback on compliance and permit faster implementation of the Agreed Framework.  In 
addition, in the event of another IAEA-DPRK dispute, transparency could continue via 
                                                 
46 Ibid, 265. 
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this bilateral arrangement.47  Third, Albright provided a detailed description and 
recommendation for what standard of accuracy North Korea should be held to as 
United States offers, this policy approach will result in limited transparency.  Proponents 
of this policy point out that some visibility is better than none—none being the level 
provided by coercion or military force until the policy achieves North Korean 
capitulation.  In addition, North Korea has a history of rejecting higher levels of 
inspections that both the United States and the IAEA demand to ensure compliance.  
                                                
compared to other IAEA inspections such as South Africa.  In short, he argued that North 
Korea should be held to a plutonium reporting accuracy that is within 10-20 percent of 
inspector’s estimates.48  Seongwhun Cheon also addressed the inspection issue, detailing 
the pros and cons of five different inspection regimes.  Regardless of the inspection 
regime’s format, to achieve greater openness she recommended inspectors recognize and 
promote North Korea’s scientific advances due to North Korean cultural emphasis on 
pride and self-respect.49     
Even accepting a wider range of accurate reporting, North Korea will be reluctant 
to open its doors to inspectors.  A 1984 tape-recorded conversation with Kim Jong-il 
smuggled out by a kidnapped South Korean actress, reveals his reluctance to open up his 
country to any foreign influence:   
After having experienced about thirty years of socialism, I feel we need to 
expand to the Western world to feed the people.  The reality is that we are 
behind the West.  However, we cannot afford to open up even as the 
Chinese are urging because we have been stuck strategically.  Opening up 
the country even for tourism would be naturally tantamount to 
disarmament and could only be done after unification.50 
4. Overall Prospects for Increasing Transparency  
Absent a threat for non-compliance, other than losing whatever incentive the 
 
47 David Albright, “Ensuring Nuclear Transparency on the Korean Peninsula: What is an Adequate 
Approach?” 59. (2001), www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/monitoringVerification/index.html. 
(accessed April 2004). 
48 Ibid, 62. 
49 Seongwhun Cheon, “North Korea’s Nuclear Problem: Political Implications and Inspection 
Formats,” 27 January 2003, US-DPRK Next Step Workshop, Nautilus Institute, Washington, D.C. 
50 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 349.  Cited text is both 
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Since North Korea can choose to accept or reject whatever inducements the United States 
offers in return for surrendering its nuclear weapons, it has greater leverage to limit 
inspections.   
Assuming North Korea agrees to special inspections, an incentive-based policy 
runs a relatively high risk of North Korean cheating.  Even utilizing a quid-pro-quo 
approach, the chances for North Korea to cheat by hiding nuclear weapons or future 
production capability is relatively high as compared to a coercive approach or military 
force.  Incremental verification mechanisms may prevent another financially costly 
mistake if North Korea violates protocol high enough level of 
transparency, however, to achiev risk.  In short, the risk of North Korea 
retaining or selling nuclea nology is higher than the chance for 
successful compliance.  Similarly, it is not in anyone’s best interests to dismiss past North 
Korean violations of signed agreements.  Although it can be argued that North Korea 
technically adhered to the specifics of the Agreed Framework, it clearly violated the spirit 
and intent of the 1994 Agreement and the specifics of the 1991 joint North-South 
declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.   
D. IMPACT ON NEIGHBORS 
1. China 
China would like noth tes to resolve the current 
crisis quietly by providing North Korea the  desperately seeks, security 
guarantees.  China’s threat per ever, 
it fears nuclear proliferation implications of Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan going nuclear.  In addition, China fears that North Korea may 
provoke a preemptive U.S. attack that would trigger massive refugee flows into China 
and result in a unified Korea under ROK control with the U.S. alliance intact.  This 
policy approach would be the easiest to sell to North Korea and permits China to tout 
itself as the great mediator that peacefully resolved the most pressing security issue in 
Northeast Asia without sacrificing anything significant.  The carrot approach achieves all 
three of China’s objectives: no nuclear weapons, no war, and no North Korean collapse.   
.  It cannot force a 
e acceptably low 
r weapons or tech
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ception of North Korean nuclear weapons is low; how
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It also would have no negative impact upon key economic considerations such as trade 
with South Korea and China’s continued supply of coal and oil to meet North Korea’s 
energy needs.   
2. Japan 
In contrast to China, Japan perceives North Korean nuclear weapons and its 
ballistic missiles as a direct, credible threat.  Even though incentive based policies would 
also benefit Japan, it is not likely to trust North Korean compliance.  Extensive drug 
trafficking, admitted kidnappings, threats to turn Tokyo into a sea of fire, and lobbing a 
3-stage missile over mainland Japan have left a lasting negative impression of North 
Korea on the Japanese psyche.  Although in the past, there has been little public support 
to change Japan’s “peace constitution,” in April 2003, the Japanese Defense Agency 
(JDA) revised its policy of, “possessing the minimum defense capability necessary for an 
independent country” to, “coping with new threats.”51  In response to the 1998 Taepo 
Dong launch, Japan launched two spy satellites in March 2003, in a calculated move to 
be less reliant upon American intelligence sources.  Other military defense measures 
include more active support of U.S. missile defense, cons
PAC-3 missile systems around critical infrastructure, and mounting ship-based missile 
defense systems on Aegis-class destroyers.52   
In addition to considering military posture changes, Japan has withheld 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea during the current crisis.  They have also begun 
to consider policy options in the event incentive based diplomacy fails.  For example, 
during the 1994 crisis, Japan estimated that it might be able to reduce some of the 
approximately $600 million per year that flows into North Korea from Korean 
sympathizers living in Japan.53   
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3. South Korea 
The popular expression, “The road from Washington to Pyongyang must pass 
through Seoul,” indicates the precarious position of the U.S.-ROK alliance.54  Even 
though North Korea’s record of aggression against the South is replete with outrageous 
examples of unconstrained aggression, some current ROK leaders do not appear to 
believe that North Korea will employ nuclear weapons against the South.  Similar to the 
Chinese reaction, an incentive-based approach conforms nicely with South Korea’s 
Sunshine Policy of engagement through dialogue and exchanges.  Although difficult for 
U.S. diplomats to comprehend in light of past violence, many South Koreans feel a 
kinship with North Korea and actually view the United States as the key obstacle to 
peaceful reunification of the peninsula and the true target of North Korean nuclear 
weapons.55   
President Roh’s inexperience in national politics and international crisis was 
evident at the outset of his administration.  Any of Roh’s comments viewed as too 
supportive of a U.S. hard-line approach toward North Korea met angry domestic 
resistance.  Eventually, Roh’s administration settled on a policy of not tolerating North 
Korean nuclear weapons, but resolving the situation peacefully.  He appears unwilling to 
even consider what steps should be taken if diplomacy fails, referring to the situation as 
an issue, not a crisis.  This unwillingness to even consider military strikes against North 
Korea negatively impacts the perception of the U.S.-ROK alliance, limits the chance for 
coercive diplomacy success, and could cripple potential military operations by denying 
U.S. forces to operate from South Korea.   
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China and South Korea favor an incentive-based policy approach, are not 
supportive of coercive options, and explicitly object to any discussion of the use of 
military force.56  Japan, would also prefer an incentive-based policy approach, but has 
similar views to most U.S. diplomats that the prospects for success are not good.   
E. COSTS 
It is possible, however, to buy North Korean concessions--sometimes.  If the
allegations are confirmed in court, the historic North-South summit of 2000 may have 
been financed under the table.  To summarize an article from the Korea Herald, a South 
Korean probe alleges that Kim Dae Jung’s former culture minister Park transferred 
hundreds of millions of dollars from Hyundai’s Asian chairman Chung Mong-hun to 
North Korea in order to entice them to agree to the summit.57 Park was alleged to have  
secret contacts within the North Korean government. Domestically, former South 
Korean Presidents Roh and Kim Dae Jung publicly admitted taking illegal payoffs and 
 
stated that operating political slush funds had been the norm for decades.58 
North Korea has a track record of seeking financial or humanitarian aid for any 
concessions.  In August 1998, U.S. intelligence uncovered a suspected secret North 
Korean underground facility that it wanted to inspect.  According to Don Oberdorfer’s 
sources, North Korea initially requested $300 million to permit U.S. inspectors access to 
the site.59  New York Times correspondent David Sanger published an article on 17 
August 1998 that put the issue on the front page.  According to Oberdorfer, after six 
months of negotiations that established a price of 600,000 tons of food and a new potato-
production program, a 14-member U.S. team inspected Kumchang-ni for three days in 
May 1999.  Their findings released 25 June 1998, revealed a grid pattern of underground 
tunnels totaling six miles in length, but the facility did not contain a nuclear reactor or 
reprocessing plant.   
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In addition to money and food, it is possible to trade North Korean concessions 
for issues they view as critical.  For example, the cancellation of the joint ROK-U.S. 
exercise Team Spirit achieved major gains in previous negotiations with North Korea.  
An incentive-based policy approach is less costly to all countries than a second Korean 
War both in terms of treasure and of lives.  Paying for incentives such as energy and food 
would cost South Korea more than they would lose in trade with the North.  China should 
 
 
executive director called managing the organization as difficult as “herding cats.”   One 
internal source of frustration was the disparity in financial support for the Light Water 
Reactor Construction Project in North Korea.  A Republican controlled House of 
Representatives accused the Clinton administration of being soft on North Korea and 
refused to pay for any construction costs.  Congress begrudgingly appropriated 
approximately $35 million annually to pay for HFO shipments.61  In stark contrast, South 
Korea shouldered most of the economic burden, paying approximately $4 billion and  
                                                
not be expected to offer any public incentives for North Korea to surrender its nuclear 
weapons and thus incurs no costs beyond participating in the six party talks.  U.S. 
Congressional approval for incentive policy costs will be difficult to obtain, but would 
most likely cost less than enforcing rigid economic sanctions via a blockade or more 
flexible sanctions such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by 
President Bush in December 2002.     
1. KEDO 
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was 
established as a financial consortium to facilitate financing agreed to under the 1994 
Agreed Framework.  The European Union joined the three original countries, the United
States, South Korea, and Japan, in 1997.  The organization’s charter requires consensus 
and provides each country veto power.  KEDO began operating in July 1995 and ran 
aground almost immediately.  Facing both internal and external challenges, its former
60
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Japan funding $1 billion.62  Tension developed when South Korea and Japan pointed out 
that the United States demanded to lead an organization in which it provided less than 
one percent of its funding.   
2. Risks 
Successful implementation of an incentive based policy approach has virtually no 
risk of escalating into military conflict and thus no predictable potential loss of life.  It 
does however run a high risk of failure.  The result of incentive based policy failure is a 
shift in policy that most likely leads to coercion or military force.    
F. PRECEDENT 
An incentive-only policy approach establishes a horrendous precedent for future 
proliferation cases.  The purported view is that North Korea is successfully blackmailing 
the United States into paying to stop its behavior, which violated the NPT among other 
protocols.  The potential lesson learned for other countries such as Syria and Iran could 
be that rapid development of nuclear weapons not only brings the United States to the 
negotiating table, but also opens its treasury.  Consider the recent opposite precedent 
established by Libya’s unveiling of its nuclear program in order to secure the benefits of 
 
cooperating with the United States and avoid the costs of getting caught.   
President Bush publicly praised Colonel Ghadafi for abandoning Libya’s pursuit 
of illegal weapons and promised improved relations pending completion of promises 
made.  In his speech to announce increased nonproliferation policies in February 2004, 
President Bush called on other regimes to follow Libya’s example.63  Analysis of Libya’s 
nuclear capitulation may reveal the true reasons it quit pursuing nuclear weapons, but one 
could argue that the benefits gained by compliance with international norms outweighed
the costs of non-compliance.  What remains to be seen in Libya’s case is what key 
Libyan leaders believed to be their cost benefit analysis.   
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G. SUMMARY 
Even though an incentive-based policy approach is an easy sell to North Korea’s 
neighbors and is relatively inexpensive, its chances for success are slim.  In light of joint 
bitterness following the demise of the Agreed Framework, previous failures to agree 
upon an acceptable inspection regime, and North Korea’s tendency not to act unless 
threatened, there is little chance for an incentive only based policy to succeed.  The 
United States most likely will not offer something valuable enough to entice North Korea 
to surrender the nuclear weapons that it sacrificed so much to produce.  Even assuming 
the deal was sweet enough for North Korea to accept, it will presumably not accept the 
high level of transparency that U.S. negotiators will demand.   
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III. THE STICK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares and contrasts the advantages and disadvantages of
potential coercive diplomatic solutions and their chance for success based on information 
on U.S. plans for coercive diplomacy during the 1994 nuclear crisis.  Coercive diplomacy 
without incentives that meet North Korea’s dire energy and food needs and provide a 
face-saving exit ramp will fail to achieve the U.S. objective of complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible nuclear disarmament.  Transparency problems that emerge during an 
incentive-based policy also exist with a coercive policy.  Quite simply, North Korea
opposes opening its country to external review.  In addition, the required multilateral 
approach significantly reduces the chances for successful execution of coercive 




North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons.  Finally, coercive diplomacy would likely 
only increase the misery suffered by North Korean citizens because Kim Jong-il can 
insulate his regime from the effects of economic disaster.   
B. COERCIVE THEORY REVIEW 
1. Coercive Diplomacy  
George limited his study of coercion to what he termed defensive strategies and 
differentiated them from other non-military strategies.  He described defensive coercion 
as, “efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.”64  Defensive coercion 
differs from offensive uses of coercion, which he referred to as blackmail strategies and 
defined as, “efforts to persuade a victim to give up something of value without putting up 
resistance.”65  Since North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons violated the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, the 1991 Joint North South declaration for a nuclear free Korean 
Peninsula, and the 1994 Agreed Framework, it is possible to view coercive diplomacy as 
defensive since the policy goal would be to stop the action of nuclear weapons 
development.  A counter argument would be that coercive diplomacy at this time would 
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be offensive in nature because it seeks to force North Korea to surrender something of 
extreme value, their nuclear weapons.  Regardless of the nuances, coercive policy 
application strives to first halt, then reverse North Korea’s nuclear weapon’s 




offensive and defensive coercion and occasionally deterrence.67  Deterrence is strategy to 
prevent an adversary from taking an action and thus different from coercion that seeks to 
stop or reverse an opponent’s action.  With respect to how lofty an objective coercive 
diplomacy can hope to achieve, George used three levels: stop an action, reverse past 
accomplishments, and cease hostile behavior by forcing governmental or regime change.  
Current Bush administration policy seeks a second level objective, the surrender of 
nuclear weapons, but stops short of the third level, North Korean regime change.  
Obviously, the higher the policy goal, the higher the required level of effort.  In addition, 
how dearly an adversary values what they have accomplished will increase the level of 
coercive effort and ultimately decrease the probability of success. 
 
                                                
George also differentiated defensive coercion from four other non-military
strategies: drawing a line, buying time to explore a negotiated settlement, retaliation and 
reprisals, and engaging in a test of capabilities.  In drawing a line, one party simply warns 
their opponent that any further action will provoke a strong response.  The buying time
strategy is self-explanatory and can be used if a defender is operating from a position of 
disadvantage or believes that their opponent’s dissatisfaction has some merit.  George 
described reprisals as carefully measured responses that match, but do not exceed, the 
adversary’s actions.66  Finally, he used the U.S. airlift response to the ground-based 
Russian blockade of Berlin following the Second World War as an example of testing 
capabilities as a response to an adversary’s action.   
George preferred not to use Thomas Schelling’s term, compellance, because it 





2. Turning Theory into Policy  
George listed two requirements for coercive diplomacy to succeed.  First, 
coercion requires a credible and potent enough threat to convince an adversary that it 
well as how much they are demanding of an adversary.  Finally, diplomats must decide 
whether to offer any incentives (carrots) for compliance or the speed of reply.   Chapter 
III discusses turning theory into specific policy for North Korea Also, both the Perry 
Report and Richard Armitage’s recommendation for dealing with North Korea contain 
submitted policy recommendations.   
3. Richard Armitage Recommendations and the Perry Report 
Richard Armitage chaired a working group on U.S. policy toward North Korea in 
the late 1990s and the group’s findings, initially published in March 1999, were reprinted 
in the 2000 Institute for Science and International Study book, Solving the North Korean 
should acquiesce to their opponent’s demands.  Second, coercive diplomacy assumes a 
“rational” opponent.  George explained three limitations of his abstract model of 
coercion.  First, the model only identifies the general logic of coercion and does not 
include what is necessary to convert it into policy.  Second, an operationalized model is 
required to give it a predictive capability.  Last, it is not a stand-alone strategy and it is 
essential to incorporate it into a broader strategy.  George recommended four tasks to 
design a coercive policy recommendation: 
• Fill in the four key variables: a demand, level of urgency, a threat, and 
potential incentives; 
• Identify a preferred variant (level) of coercion: Classic Ultimatum, Tacit 
Ultimatum, Turn the Screw, or Try & See; 
• Replace the purely rational actor theory with an empirically derived 
behavioral model; 
• Take into account the contextual variables of the given situation. 
The first task consists of four critical decision points.  First, leaders must decide 
what to demand of an adversary.  Second, policy makers must decide if they wish to 
create a sense of urgency for compliance and if so, how.  Third, strategists must develop 
a credible and potent threat of punishment commensurate with operational capabilities as 
35 
Nuclear Puzzle.68  The group outlined the debate surrounding the failure of the 1994 
Agreed Framework and its three underlying assumptions: the Framework ended North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons development, North Korea was a failed state on the verge of a 




Department of State, Wendy R. Sherman, and consulted with senior officials from several 
agencies and nations, including the DPRK.  An unclassified report released on 12 
October 1999, detailed numerous findings, policy options, and a policy recommendation.  
At the heart of the report’s “new comprehensive, and integrated approach” toward 
negotiations with North Korea were “complete and verifiable assurances that the DPRK 
does not have a nuclear weapons program.”73  The Perry Report did not make more 
detailed recommendations on inspection team composition or locations to visit.   
 
                                                
outside world.69  The well-written policy recommendations included a reality check as of 
1999, supported the conduct of the Perry Report, and called for such things as security 
assurances, food and economic assistance, the possibility of sanctions for compliance 
failure, and the six-party talks format currently being used.  Furthermore, Armitage asked 
two fundamental questions, the first of which has been answered by the Bush 
administration.  “What precisely does the United States want from North Korea?”70  U.S.
policy objectives are the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament of North
Korean nuclear weapons.  Second, “what price is the United States prepared to pay for 
it?”71  He also outlined the two dismal options available should diplomacy fail: live with 
and deter a nuclear North Korea or preemption.72  
In November 1998, President Clinton tasked Dr. William J. Perry to lead a team 
of experts to conduct a comprehensive U.S. policy review toward North Korea.  His team
worked for eight months with an interagency group headed by the Counselor of the 
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C. BACKGROUND TO CURRENT SITUATION 
The second round of six-party talks met in Beijing in late February 2004 with 
little or no tangible success.  How long the United States and North Korea will continue 
to dance with their Northeast Asian partners remains to be seen, but at some point, it can 
be assumed that the U.S. administration will want to change the music by shifting to a 
more coercive policy approach.  During the 1994 crisis, former Secretary of Defense 
Perry stated that the policy shift from “preventive diplomacy” to “coercive diplomacy,” 
including sanctions, occurred in early June 1994, when the IAEA reported that North 








coercion such as sanctions for fear of alienating China with its Security Council Veto 
authority.  Vice President Cheney’s April 2004 visit to Beijing reportedly included  
                                                
1. Then 
During the 1994 shift in policy, the United States adopted a coercive policy of 
gradual sanctions that followed Alexander George’s steps for turning theory into policy. 
The United States had a plan for filling in the blanks for its demands, level of urgency, 
threat, and potential incentives.  The administration demanded that North Korea comply 
with NPT safeguards, specifically to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor its nuclea
acilities.  With respect to the level of urgency, the administration intended to give North 
Korea thirty days to comply before enforcing the first level of what George would call a 
“turn the screw” type policy.  The first level punishment would ban arms sales and 
nuclear technology transfers.  If needed, the second level would cut off remittances
l oil supplies from abroad.  The third level would blockade shipping to and fr
North Korean ports.75  China, South Korea, and Japan expressed very little interest
pursuing even the first level of sanctions.   
2. Now 
The Bush administration is resisting the temptation to advance to the next level o
diplomatic pressure.  The administration has avoided open discussion on the prospects of 
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discussion of the North Korean issue, but no published insight into the details of the 
discussion appear.  North Korean rhetoric is not as restrained.  An official North Korean 
press release countered every aspect of U.S. policy objectives for disarmament.    
Complete nuclear dismantling is a plot to overthrow the North’s socialist 
system after stripping it of its nuclear deterrent.  Verifiable nuclear 
dismantling reflects a U.S. intention to spy on our military capabilities 
before starting a war.  Irreversible nuclear dismantling is nothing other 
than a noose to stifle us after eradicating our peaceful nuclear-energy 
industry.76 
Domestically, the policy debate surrounding coercive diplomacy begins with the 
issue of rationality, which Alexander George originally viewed as a potential non-starter.  
He later relaxed this assumption by stressing the importance of behavioral model theory 
development as a solution to rationality’s limitations.77  Determining Kim Jong-il’s 
rationality and creating an accurate behavioral model appears more problematic than 
funding a manned mission to Mars.  However, how much fidelity into Kim’s thinking 
does the United States require?  Does Kim’s apparent irrationality increase his diplomatic 
strength?  
3. Kim Jong-il: Rational Actor or Midget Madman? 
Kim’s rationality is relevant because coercive diplomacy assumes that an 
adversary has a process in place to conduct cost benefit analysis based on correct, 
relevant information.  Kim Jong-il is a rational actor--as far as he is concerned.  A short 
man, standing 5’ 3”, he is reported to have said, “I know I’m an object of criticism in the 
world, but if I am being talked about, I must be doing the right things.”78  Some experts 
refer to him as a malignant narcissist whose father built over 34,000 monuments to 
himself.79  For U.S. politicians, it is easier to refer to him as a cognac-guzzling, 
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womanizer whose paranoia sent him in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.  Most 
likely, his foreign policy decisions fall somewhere in between the two extremes of 
rational actor and madman.  As a review, “to describe behavior as ‘rational’ is to say little 
more than that the actor attempts to choose a course of action that he hopes or expects to 
further his values.”80  The combination of ideas from the scholars on rationality produces 
five key points.   
• Gather all available information; 
• Understand pertinent cause and effect relationships; 
• Have a process for developing courses of action; 
• Have a method to evaluate chance of success and impact to values; 
• Select course of action that provides the greatest utility. 
A rational process, however, does not require leaders to have similar values, 
desired outcomes, or willingness to accept risk. Why would a rational leader continue to 
conduct state-sponsored terrorism and other illegal activities that limit foreign investment 
and international relief while millions of his people starve? 81  Due to North Korea’s 
extreme isolation, the world will probably never know the truth, but one theory that 
provides insight in analyzing Kim’s behavior is cognitive consistency theory.   
Consistency theory suggests that leaders deviate from rationality because of their 
inabi irs is common, 
82  
These three misperceptions lead the decision maker to avoid inconsistencies, ignore 
potentially valuable information, and attempt to remove doubt from possible outcomes.  
The result is a faulty d ion making process that only evaluates alternatives aligned 
with preconceived notions.   
lity to accept three concepts: uncertainty in international affa
preconceptions may be wrong, and their preferred options are not always the best.
ecis
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 Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking
There are four potential core beliefs that drive DPRK policies.  First, Kim Jong-il 
probably believes that the United States intends to topple his regime by military force.  
Second, Kim probably believes that possessing nuclear weapons will deter U.S. military 
action.  Third, Kim could believe that any external influence or information allowed into 
North Korea is inherently bad.  Last, he may believe that the best policy for dealing with 
the United States is to threaten or use force to achieve limited objectives, or a fait 
accompli.  There is irony in these core beliefs.  The preconception that possessing nuclear 
weapons will deter U.S. military action may, in fact, motivate the United States into 
action, also providing the regional support it requires.  Next, when viewed through Kim’s 
paradigm, he may be correct that external influence or information (the “truth” about 
such things as ROK quality of living) would result in public unrest.        
The present situation on the Korean peninsula remains dangerous owing to 
the reckless moves of the U.S. war hawks and their followers to unleash a 
war of aggression against the DPRK so that nuclear war may break there 
anytime.83 
As crazy as press releases such as the above appear, Alexander George cautions 
people to avoid using the term “irrational.”  He points out that errors in a decision-
making process such as oversimplification or arriving at different conclusions based upon 
different values do not make a process or a leader “irrational.”  He defined irrationality as 
a person who, “has abandoned reality-testing, is totally lacking in sense, behaves 
impulsively or mindlessly, etc.”84  Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright met 
with Kim Jong-il in January 2000 and stated that she had expected to meet a womanizing 
madman, but found him to be charming and able to speak knowledgably on a wide range 
of subjects without notes.85  In addition, North Korea’s history of challenging the United 
States with “bad behavior” to achieve economic benefits indicates a higher tolerance for 
risk taking than the United States, but is not a stand-alone indicator of irrationality.   
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It would be a mistake for U.S. officials to assume that DPRK leaders are irrational 
or “totally lacking in sense” just because their policies are unethical, risky, or based upon 
values with which the United States disagrees.  Consistency theory provides a starting 
point from which U.S. diplomats may form a better behavioral m of Kim Jong-il.  In 
addition, applying consistency theory to North Korea leads us to expect little change in 
Kim Jong-il’s foreign policy.  He may misinterpret or choose to ignore shifts in U.S. 
policy based upon his core beliefs.  However, limited transparency of DPRK decision-
making will continue to limit our ability to formulate an accurate behavioral model of 
Kim Jong-il.   
D. THEORY TO POLICY: FILLING IN THE BLANKS 
Assuming an incentive-only strategy fails and the Bush administration believes 
Kim is rational enough to comprehend the ramifications of a U.S. coercive policy, the 
United States will need to fill in the four key variables of George’s first task, the first 
being what to demand of North Korea.  The current U.S. administration’s demand has 
manifested itself in the press as the acronym CVI; complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
North Korean nuclear disarmament.  The administration is delicately handling the second 
variable, level of urgency.  No time limit has been given for North Korean compliance 
with U.S. demands while six-party talks continue.  However, actions such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI te a sense of urgency to North Korea and 
send a message to other countries that seek to develop nuclear weapons.  Third, the 
United States will have to communicate a credible and potent enough threat clearly that 
matches U.S. operational capabilities against the level of change it seeks in North 
Korea’s nuclear program.  This presents the most precarious position for the U.S.-ROK 
alliance and all Northeast Asian partners.  This step is the reason George noted that 
coercive diplomacy executed by multiple countries has a lower chance of success due to 
the difficulty in reaching consensus on implementation measures.  The fourth and final 
variable facing U.S. policymakers is determining if after making demands and 
threatening force, they intend to offer any incentives to provide North Korea a way out.  
As George and other political experts indicated, the timing of incentives is critical.  They 




To complete the second task, policymakers will need to choose between a gradual 
approach and demanding their ultimate objective.  A graduated approach could 
incrementally demand that the DPRK acknowledge and halt all forms of nuclear weapons 
production, surrender current weapons, and dismantle the means of production.   
Task three, deriving an empirical behavioral model, is the more difficult portion 
of coercive diplomacy policy recommendations and usually the weakest aspect of U.S. 
strategy.  It may be the underlying cause of what George’s case studies identified as a 
low U.S. success rate: two successes, three failures, and two ambiguous results.86  
Regardless of past success rates, tasks three and four are very complicated when dealing 
with the world’s last heavily armed totalitarian communist country. 
odel conundrum.  Led for the past 55 years by the 
world’s only father-son communist dictatorship, North Korea is renowned for hostile 
negotiating tactics and fiery public statements.  As George highlighted, to build an actor-
specific behavioral model accurately, it is necessary to understand the adversary’s 
motives, needs, and goals.87  Moreover, this understanding is completely reliant on the 
adversary’s perception, not what western diplomats believe to be North Korea’s motives, 
needs, and goals.  This allows for a level of fine-tuning that George argued differentiates 
conditional reciprocity from the blunter tit-for-tat cold war strategy to elicit cooperative 
behavior between actors in a prisoner’s dilemma.88  Therein lays the problem.  U.S. 
intelligence knows very little about the intimate decision-making process within North 
Korea other than the fact that Kim Jong-il retains a secure power base with complete 
control despite catastrophic domestic conditions.  In addition, North Korea’s senior 
leaders can insulate themselves from potential coercive policy effects such as food 
shortages, demonstrated by their hording of humanitarian relief supplies during disastrous 
floods in the 1990’s.  The population tolerates governmentally rationed rice based on  
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their complete indoctrination into juche, a self-reliant ideology cemented by terror.  An 
ever-increasing number of defectors also report the existence of harsh political-criminal 
camps.89   
It is essential the policy, once it takes shape, be evaluated within the context of a 
broader strategy toward North Korea.  Regarding the Bush administration’s 2001 
strategy, Selig Harrison commented:  
The problem is the Bush administration attitude.  What they have in mind 
is the use of multilateral action to pressure North Korea with no 
incentives- just all sticks, no carrots.90 
Coercion that offers no incentives is not likely to disarm a nuclear North Korea 
based upon its staggering energy and food aid requirements, past negotiating tactics, and 
significant investment in nuclear weapons development.   
E. IMPACT ON NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Coercion alone is the least likely policy approach to ensure compliance for three 
reasons.  First, North Korea will resist an inspection regime to increase transparency.  
Second, North Korean leaders are “hyper-insulated” from the hardships suffered by the 
general population.  One of Kim Jong-il’s reported methods of control is to reward 
loyalty with gifts while terrorizing unsupportive behavior.  According to a U.S. State 
Department human rights report, the DPRK has detained without trial between 150,000 to 
200,000 political prisoners in “re-education camps.”91  Simultaneous with such internal 
human rights violations, Kim uses extravagant gifts to ensure military and party loyalty.  
Reportedly, the ultimate gift is a Mercedes-Benz with a license plate beginning with “2-
16”, in honor of Kim’s 16 February 1942 birthday.92  Third, coercion runs a relatively 
high risk of cheating.  Consider the following analogy.  If you press your boot into the 
neck of an adversary prostrate on the ground, are they more likely to acquiesce to your 
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demands or to search for sand or a stick to throw in your eye?  Thus goes the debate 
surrounding the question whether or not a Security Council resolution or economic 
sanctions increases the probability of North Korea surrendering its nuclear weapons or 
allowing more intrusive inspections.  It is highly doubtful that absent any incentives, the 
threat of military force will coerce North Korea to surrender what it views to be its best 
deterrent to U.S. aggression, especially having invested decades of work and an 
enormous percentage of very limited government funds. 
F. IMPACT ON NEIGHBORS 
Coercive diplomacy policy application is complicated in a multilateral 
environment, especially in Northeast Asia where Japan, South Korea, and China rely on 
regional stability that permits economic trade and growth.  Even if all countries agree that 
North Korean nuclear weapons will destabilize the region, none agrees on the best 
approach to resolve the situation.  All three countries also stand to lose varying amounts 
of trade with North Korea.  According to economic data from 2000, over half of all North 
Korean imports come from China (26.7 percent), South Korea (16.2 percent), and Japan 
(12.3 percent).93  More recently, even though one-half of North Korea’s total trade 
volume is with China, it is only $1.05 billion.94 
1. China 
Agreeing on the policy objective of no North Korea nuclear weapons, China 
currently opposes coercive diplomatic methods such as economic sanctions to achieve the 
goal.  Internally, China continues to focus its efforts on controlling its economic growth 
(2002 GDP growth of 8 percent95) and preserving domestic single party political stability 
in order to achieve great power status.  Externally, its Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence articulate China’s policy: 
• Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
• Mutual non-aggression; 
• Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 
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Korea’s antics,” The Straits Times, (5 April 2003). 
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• Equality and mutual benefit; 
• And peaceful coexistence.96 
Regional experts are both excited by and leery of China’s increased willingness to 
assert itself with respect to North Korean nuclear weapons as evidenced by hosting the 
six-party talks.  China is quietly balancing both sides of the issue by restraining the 
United States and pressuring North Korea.  China has repeatedly asked the United States 
to reduce its level of urgency to resolve the issue and its insistence that North Korea 
admit to its highly enriched uranium nuclear weapons program.  To pressure North Korea 
to stop provoking the United States, China closed its oil pipeline to North Korea for three 
days in late February 2003.97  As the sole provider of 80 percent of North Korea’s energy 
needs along with the majority of its foreign aid, China is the key to leveraging North 
Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons.  As the recipient of the preponderance of North 
Korean refugees, referred to as economic migrants, China opposes coercion such as 
economic sanctions that would increase the flow of an already malnourished North 
Korean population.  A 2002 Human Rights Watch report estimated the number of North 
Korean refugees living in hiding in China to be anywhere from 10,000 to 300,000.98 
2. Japan 
Japanese outrage at the 1998 North Korean missile launch and North Korea’s 
admitted kidnapping of Japanese citizens is tempered only slightly by its security 
agreement with the United States, its constitutionally based belief on non-aggression as 
manifested by the maritime Self-Defense Force (SDF), and the country’s preoccupation 
with economic issues.  Enabled by the 1997 renegotiated bilateral defense guidelines with 
the United States, Japan’s reactions to the 1998 North Korean missile test have been 
subtle, yet significant.  Japan has been very supportive of the U.S. global war on 
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terrorism, to include the first overseas deployment of Japanese destroyers and support 
ships.99  Initiatives to increase the SDF’s ability to respond included legal authorizations 
to pursue and fire upon vessels in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone and an air-
refueling capability to enable the right to attack missile sites in self-defense.100   
In conjunction with these initiatives, an apparent shift in attitudes of some 
Japanese leaders has led to internal debates on policy.  Stephen Kim outlined the divide 
between Japan’s Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka who favors dialogue and 
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe who commented, “there is no one in the 
world who believes you can solve gangster troubles through dialogue.”101   
According to T. J. Pempel, an American academic expert on Japan, North Korea’s 
kidnapping of Japanese citizens is as high of a priority to Japanese leaders as the nuclear 
issue.102  In addition, a significant group of DPRK sympathizers exists and resides in 
Japan, believed to contribute between 60 to 120 billion yen per year to North Korea.103  
The North Korean trafficking of methamphetamines, kidnappings, and the 1998 missile 
test frustrated previous Japanese attempts to normalize relations with North Korea and to 
establish economic ties.  As a result, although Japan accounts for approximately one-half 
of Northeast Asia economic output, it currently only consists of 17-18 percent of North 
Korea’s trade.104  Furthermore, North Korea’s trade with Japan is declining, falling 
nearly 30 percent from 2002 to 2003, due to Japan’s crackdown on North Korean illicit 
activities such as drug trafficking and other illegal exports.105 
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Finally, Japan has already tied future North Korean humanitarian aid directly to
its behavior.  Due to a long-standing history of conflict between the two countries, its 
limited economic interests in North Korea, and its desire for regional stability, Japan 
would most likely support a U.S. led push for coercive diplomacy.   
3. South Korea 
Determined to be the “Hub of Northeast Asia,” South Korea remains focused on 
democratic and economic reforms to continue its rise in stature in the region.  The split 
on how South Koreans view North Korea is largely divided along the generation gap. 
Historically, students are the voice of change and constitute the vast majority of 
protestors.  This younger generation, referred to as the 386’rs (in their 30s, educated in 
the 1980s, and born in the 1960s), view a unified Korea as a goal whereas veterans of the 
Korean War, still familiar with its devastation, view it as a threat.  Accordingly, it is
possible to generalize the population’s view of a nuclear-armed North Korea as divided 
with conservatives fearful and the opposition party arguing that North Korean nuclear 




would not use the weapons on fellow countrymen.  Second, that following reunification, 
North Korean nuclear weapons would simply become Korean nuclear weapons.  Third, 
South Korea has made significant economic investments in its outreaches to North Korea.  
Therefore, it would shoulder the economic brunt of reunification costs and humanitarian 
relief involved with North Korean collapse.  For these reasons, South Korea would most 
likely not support coercive diplomacy, but rather incentive based diplomacy or accepting 
a nuclear armed North Korea.        
G. COSTS 
Pursuing coercive diplomacy in Northeast Asia requires the United States to 
spend international diplomatic capital, domestic political capital, and treasure.  None of 
which it can currently afford.  Prior to the November 2004 U.S. Presidential election and 
the resolution of the South Korean Presidential impeachment process, no significant 
policy shifts will occur.  In light of domestic and international blowback from the failure 
to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the perceived unilateral action, and the current 
civil unrest in Iraq, major policy moves in Northeast Asia are currently politically 
impossible.  However, North Korea has a track record of brinkmanship at vulnerable 
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times such as these.  If it elects to test a nuclear weapon or conduct another long-range 
missile test, that which was politically impossible could become imperative.  It is 
possible to categorize the costs of coercive diplomacy into financial, human life, and the 
risk of the threat of the execution of military force.   
1. Financial 
Economic sanctions will not adversely affect the U.S. economy directly due to 
long standing sanctions in place since the Korean War.  Although the 1994 Agreed 
Framework slightly eased sanctions, suffice it to say North Korea is not a key U.S. 
trading partner.  However, if the United States executes some type of blockade of North 
Korea, the required military buildup would entail operating expenses and have a chilling 
effect on world trade and financial markets. 
that if Kim’s regime determines its survival is at stake, it will lash out while it still can.  
                                                
2. Lives 
Although executing economic sanctions against North Korea would significantly 
increase tension in the region, it should not have a large toll in military casualties unless 
the blockade leads to war.  However, coercion such as economic sanctions would 
increase the suffering of an already beleaguered society.  Insulated from the masses, Kim 
maintains a firm policy of isolationism and continues to espouse self-reliance while 
experts estimate that at least 2.5 million North Koreans died of starvation in the past 
decade.106  In fact, following disastrous floods in the 1990s, the Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) Doctors Without Borders and Action Against Hunger protested 
the North Korean government’s control of their relief efforts and supplies.  The NGOs’ 
objections were ignored as emergency relief supplies were diverted to the military and 
other government officials.  As a result, the NGOs pulled out of North Korea.107   
3. Risk: Will Sanctions Lead to War? 
Economic sanctions, specifically a naval blockade of North Korea runs a very 
high risk of leading to a second Korean War.  North Korean press releases along with 
diplomatic statements have stated as much.  Strategists must account for the likelihood 
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South Korea and China refer to the risk of war as one of the reasons they do not support 
this policy approach.  In fact, during the 1994 nuclear crisis, Secretary of Defense Perry 
asked General Luck to prepare three options for force buildup and to estimate the 
devastation of full-scale war on the peninsula.  Although some South Koreans may 
support the “Sunshine Policy” of engagement, others realize that one third of South 
Korea’s 47 million people live in Seoul, less than 30 miles from the DMZ.108   
H. PRECEDENT 
If the United States were able to convince its regional partners that coercive 
diplomacy was the best policy approach, it would establish a favorable precedent for 
future nonproliferation cases.  In a best-case scenario, it would not only resolve the 
current nuclear crisis, but also establish the framework for a regional security structure 
for future “tough cases” unable to be resolved by regional organizations such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF).  In contrast, if an agreement is not possible, or coercive diplomacy is applied and 
ultimately fails, it will simply embolden future countries weighing the cost benefit 
analysis of developing nuclear weapons.   
I. SUMMARY 
Coercive diplomacy was on the U.S. policy option table during the 1994 nuclear 
crisis, but never tested multilaterally due to the bilateral breakthrough that led to the 
Agreed Framework.  Even during the discussion phase ten years ago, China and South 
Korea were reluctant to pursue coercive policy development seriously.  Assuming the 
successful herding of regional partners toward an agreed upon policy, North Korean 
leaders are immune to the consequences of coercion due to their insulation from the 
population’s strife.  Furthermore, North Korea resists increased transparency and is more 
likely to cheat if the U.S. puts a boot to the throat than if it put a ship full of relief 
supplies in port.  The execution of severe coercive diplomacy to force North Korea to 
surrender its nuclear weapons runs a high risk of war, high risk of cheating, is not 
supported by two key regional partners, and thus unlikely to succeed.  This leaves few 
palatable options available, one of which may be to strike the right balance of adequate 
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coercion combined with attractive incentives in order to lure North Korea out of its shell.  
A less desirable option is the transition from diplomacy to military force, or the 
sledgehammer.   
50 
IV. THE SLEDGEHAMMER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Is military force to disarm a nuclear North Korea a policy option worth 
considering?  Last year, President Bush thought so: “I still believe this (crisis) will be 
solved diplomatically…All options are on the table of course.”109  Less than one month 
later, he was even more open about the use of force when he stated, “If they don’t work 
diplomatically, they’ll have to work militarily.”110  Mr. Levi, of the Federation of 
solution that diplomacy might.  Taking out Yongbyon would not affect 
North Korea’s highly enriched uranium program.  It’s very hard for us to 
verify how far along they are because we don’t know where the uranium 
facilities are.  That means there is no military option short of regime 
change that will completely remove the North Korean nuclear threat.111   
Although a combined U.S.-ROK force could defeat North Korea’s military forces, 
a second Korean war would decimate the peninsula’s infrastructure, negatively impact 
the region’s economy, and cost all three countries billions of dollars and hundreds of 
thousands of lives.  Do the benefits of preventing North Korea from potentially 
threatening, using, or selling nuclear weapons outweigh the costs of devastation 
associated with military conflict?  Can the United States justify unilateral action against 
North Korea if South Korea objects?  I propose it currently cannot do so, but that a North 
Korean nuclear test or another Taepo Dong missile test over Japan would change the 
political situation in favor of more aggressive U.S. policy options.  This chapter delves 
into the unthinkable, a second Korean war.  If the United States is determined to 
eliminate North Korean nuclear weapons and all forms of diplomacy fail, military force 
can disarm  an extremely high cost.   
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Following a brief analysis of force disposition in Northeast Asia, this chapter 
evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of using military force to achieve po  
objectives and its chance for success.  It evaluates potential military operations taken 
against North Korea with the political objective of completely, verifiably, and 
irreversibly disarm  weapons.  This objective implies North 
Korean regime change.  The threat or actual use of surgical air strikes, special forces 
operations, and limited military force are valid techniques during coercive diplom
are not capable of achieving the stated U.S. policy objective of complete disarmam
B. BACKGROUND 
It is not a coincidence that the USS Pueblo, seized in international waters on 23 
January 1968, is on display near Pyongyang in the Taedong River, relatively close to 
where the USS General Sherman ran aground, was burned, and its crew massacred by 
Koreans in August 1866.112  On the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Pueblo seizure, a  
Korean official press release entitled, “U.S. warned not to forget the lesson of the Pueblo 
incident,” included rhetoric about the ship’s historic capture and how it is now visited by 
“an endless stream of people.”113  When advocating a second Korean War scenario, one 
must not forget that North Korea is heavily armed, motivated, and fearful of a U.S. 
preemptive attack.   
The first Korean War, fought with antiquated weapons by today’s standards, 
killed or wounded 900,000 Chinese, 520,000 North Koreans, and 400,000 United Nations 
Command soldiers.  Nearly two-thirds of the 400,000 UN casualties were South Korean, 
along with 36,000 U.S. troops killed in action.114  Approximately three million Korea  
civilians, one-tenth of the peninsula’s population, were killed, wounded, or mi
because of the war.115  U.S. air power was particularly devastating to North Korea, and 
the country’s military realized that anything on the surface of the earth would
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destroyed.  As a result, North Korea’s military started digging in the 1950’s and has not 
stopped.  Approximately four thousand underground facilities (UGFs) within one 
hundred miles of the demilitarized zone house virtually every type of weapon in North 
Korea’s arsenal, including aircraft, armor, command centers, and even naval forces along 
the coastline.116      
1. Force Strengths 
Seventy percent of North Korea’s million-man army is garrisoned within one 
hundred miles of the demilitarized zone, and supported by 8,000 to 11,000 artillery pieces 
in hardened artillery sites (HARTS).117  Thousands of expansive UGFs protect most of 
the troops, equipment, weapons, and supplies supported by five thousand metric tons of 
chemical agents including, nerve, choking, blister, and blood agents.118  In addition to 
their large numbers and chemical weapons, North Korean troops should be considered 
highly motivated following decades of political and social indoctrination in addition to 
enjoying a higher quality of life than average North Korean citizens enjoy.  Unlike Iraq’s 
Korea’s army of 672,000 m ates maintains roughly 100,000 troops in 
the Pacific Rim, l force of nearly 1.4 million service 





                                                
military, North Korea’s military will fight with discipline and the esprit-de-corps that 
flows from defending one’s homeland.   
Across the DMZ, 4.5 million reservists and 37,000 U.S. troops support South 
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Table 2. Northeast Asia Military Force Strength120 
 
DPRK ROK US China Japan
Total 1,173,000 672,000 1,396,200 2,200,000 234,000
Army 1,003,00* 560,000 482,000 1,700,000 148,300
Navy 60,000 60,000 547,136^ 220,000 43,700
Air Force 110,000 52,000 374,700 420,000 42,000
Legend                                                                                                                                    
* = Includes approximately 100,000 SOF troops                                                                   
^ = includes 170,000 USMC troops  
In time of war, the 37,000 U.S. forces in South Korea are expected to be rapidly 
augmented by tens of thousands more troops.  However, the timing and size of U.S. force
buildup has tremendous political and military implications.  Too little or too late and 
North Korea may be able to achieve significant breakthroughs.  Too much, too early 
could make North Korea feel threatened and determine it is better to strike first before a
 
 
window of opportunity closes.  North Korea observed and learned from U.S. 
deployments during Operation Desert Storm.  In May 1994, a North Korean colonel told 
a U.S. officer at Panmunjom, “We are not going to let you do a buildup.”121  North Korea 
has the ability to monitor U.S. operations on the peninsula that indicate intentions such as 
force build-ups and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).  This monitoring 
ability, when combined with North Korea’s heightened threat perception of a preemptive 
U.S. attack, make large-scale force movements to the peninsula similar to throwing 
matches into a dry powder keg.   
2. Objectives 
What motivated North Korea to invest four decades worth of limited research and 
procurement assets to develop nuclear weapons?  Four potential explanations are easy to 
remember by the terms blackmail, black market, deter, or detonate.  As mentioned in a 
typical debate about the 1994 Agreed Framework, some argued that North Korea claimed 
to have nuclear weapons in order to blackmail the United States and its regional partners 
into providing much needed energy aid.  Others refer to North Korea’s prolific ballistic 
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missile sales, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting of U.S. currency as proof that once 
North Korea possessed enough nuclear weapons for its own purposes, they would likely 
sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations capable of meeting North Korea’s demand 
for hard currency.  Advocates of deterrence refer to North Korea’s press releases that 
state North Korea had to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. imperialist aggression.  
Last, some argue that because Kim Jong-il ultimately seeks not only his regime’s 
survival, but also the forceful reunification of the Korean peninsula under communist 
rule, he could detonate nuclear weapons to achieve his political objectives.   
According to multiple unclassified sources, North Korean political/military 
objectives are threefold: regime survival, quick peninsula reunification under a 
communist regime using overwhelming military force, and status as a “great and 
powerful nation.”122  Military planners anticipate that the start of any North Korean 
offensive will include insertion of one of the country’s asymmetric strengths, the world’s 
largest standing special operations forces, totaling over 100,000.123  North Korea could 
attempt its own version of “shock and awe” by combining special operations force 
insertions under cover of an artillery barrage capable of 500,000 rounds per hour for 
several hours and the use of a chemical weapons stockpile believed to be 5,000 metric 
tons.124  Although obsolete compared to U.S.-ROK weapons, North Korea’s 1,600 
aircraft, 2,000 tanks, and 800 ships combined with the element of surprise, could be 
enough to overwhelm even the most advanced military initially.125  Realizing that Seoul 
has one-third of South Korea’s population, it is conceivable that a concentrated North 
Korean attack on Seoul could destroy, if not occupy, the city’s infrastructure, compelling 
South Korea to negotiate with Kim Jong-il following a fait accompli.  Moreover, South 
Korea has a limited number of aerial ports and seaports capable of receiving large 
numbers of incoming troops or outgoing evacuees.                                                    
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As obvious as it may seem, which opponent initiates hostilities dramatically 
impacts the conduct of the war.  Knowing exactly when to increase force levels, conduct 
last-minute combat preparations, evacuate non-essential personnel, and strike first 
significantly alters the duration and conduct of the war.  Troops moving forward are more 
exposed than troops defending well-fortified positions.  If North Korea starts the war, 
will there be adequate strategic warning to flow into country appropriate forces?  Can the 
United States and South Korea defend Seoul long enough to permit a shift of forces from 
Iraq?  If U.S. and South Korean forces start the war, how survivable are North Korean 
 
thus controlling the limited traversable valleys.  Limited airspace and weather also 
present more significant problems than warfare in Iraq, for example.     
North Korea has limited airspace in which to fight.  The country’s 74,819 square 
miles is 18.6 percent of that of Iraq, and reduced even more when realizing that the 
majority of North Korea’s forces are within one hundred miles of the demilitarized zone.  
Thus, the air “battlespace” is reduced to approximately 14,800 square miles or 5.5 
percent of Iraq, ignoring deep-strike sorties.  De-conflicting airspace slightly smaller than 
Mississippi that contains two to three thousand sorties per day is no small task.126  
Another obstacle can be weather.  On the ground, monsoons cause severe flooding with 
                                                
underground facilities?  How much international or regional support to expect if the U.S. 
conducts another preemptive war?  These are just a few of the strategic questions to 
answer when evaluating the ramifications of using military force to achieve North Korean 
nuclear disarmament.  These questions demonstrate the complexity of proposing military 
force and fuel the debate on this policy option.   
3. Obstacles 
Warfighting in Korea is difficult for many reasons, two of which are geography 
and environment.  A peninsula of mountains, Korea has few avenues of approach for
large forces to cross the demilitarized zone.  The operational significance of these two 
corridors, Kaeson and Chorwon, which were well used in the 1950s, is completely 
understood for future conflicts.  Both North and South, along with the United States, 
grasp the significance of occupying the high ground, its corresponding fields of fire, and 
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summer monthly average rainfalls nearly ten inches, bitterly cold winters, and fog often 
reducing visibility.127  In contrast, during the air-war of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 70 
percent of Iraq was completely cloud free one out of every three days, and only 4 percent 
of sorties were scrubbed or ineffective due to bad weather.128  Finally, if North Korea 
occupies Seoul, airpower’s ability to perform close air support (CAS) is more restricted 
than in the two primary north-south corridors along the demilitarized zone.  Close air 
support in an urban area such as Seoul would significantly complicate operational issues 
such as minimizing collateral damage, positive target identification, and preventing 
fratricide.     
C. IMPACT ON NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The military force policy option provides the greatest control of North Korean 
nuclear weapons, but it does so at an extraordinarily high cost.  If the United States 
determines that it cannot risk future North Korean cheating under diplomatic agreements, 
regime change and temporary occupation offer an alternative.  In addition to the 
devastation of war, critics argue that military occupation of North Korea may not even 
achieve U.S. policy objectives in light of intelligence failures in Iraq, resulting in the 
inability to locate weapons of mass destruction.  Not knowing where North Korea’s 
highly enriched uranium program and facilities are located is a debilitating limitation to 
quick military success.  Likewise, losing tens of thousands of soldier’s lives without 
 
 
finding a smoking gun would be everyone’s worst nightmare.  Despite the high cost and 
risk, military force provides greater transparency of North Korean nuclear weapons than 
a diplomatic solution. 
D. IMPACT ON NEIGHBORS 
Formal security alliances exist between several key Northeast Asian countries: 
the Japanese-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the 1953 ROK-U.S. 
Mutual Defense Treaty, and the 1961 Agreement between China and North Korea.  The 
Japanese-U.S. Defense Agreement was re-confirmed as recently as 1996.129  Similarly,
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the 1966 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the 1991 Wartime Host Nation 
Support Agreement reinforced the ROK-U.S. Alliance.130  Beyond formal alliances, 
Northeast Asia has experienced globalization (increased inter-dependence) similar to the 
rest of the industrialized world, which reduces the participating countries willingness to 
interrupt the status quo.     
1. China 
Will China provide North Korea support during a second Korean War?  Second to 
South Korea in its unwillingness to support the use of U.S. military force, China strongly 
opposes this policy option.  The United States has to assume that China will not commit 
ground forces, or U.S. policy makers must fundamentally reconsider the use of military 
force.  The central question is how much support (publicly or privately) would China 
provide North Korea?  North Korea was shrewd enough to build some of its 
infrastructure near the border with China.  The United States must be extremely cautious 
in conducting operations near China’s border with North Korea.  China could expect to 
have no physical collateral damage to its property; however, the economic impacts of 
war, tens of thousands of refugees, and U.S.-ROK forces near its border remain China’s 
primary concerns.   
 
Although China publicly supports Korean reunification, this support assumes the 
resulting Korean state is not anti-Chinese.  In addition, China does not want the entire 
Korean peninsula converted to capitalism, nor would it like to have U.S. troops near its 
border.131  China’s ability to influence U.S. policy stems from more than its military
strength.  In 1991, the U.S. trade deficit with China was $12.6 billion.132  Twelve years 
later, it was ten times that amount, reaching $124 billion in 2003.133  After China 
established trade offices in Beijing and Seoul in October 1990 and it established full 
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diplomatic relations with South Korea in August 1992, bilateral trade steadily increased.  
Hitting $41.2 billion in 2002, China actually replaced the United States as South Korea’s 




 disputes such as 
the Japanese colonization of Korea and North Korea’s kidnappings, drug trafficking, and 
naval skirmishes, Japan should expect a strike by North Korea.  The debate is by what 
and how bad the damage would be.  Although some may argue that the U.S. military 
buildup would be an economic boost to Japan’s economy, a major war on the Korean 
peninsula would have disastrous effects on the region’s economies.   
3. South Korea 
South Korea strongly opposes even the consideration of military force to disarm a 
nuclear North Korea.  President Roh repeatedly has stated in public that peaceful 
diplomatic means must resolve the nuclear issue.  Not only do younger South Koreans 
view the United States as the obstacle to reunification and the target of North Korean 
aggression, but also they understand the devastation that peninsula-wide war would 
cause.  “The hub of Northeast Asia” is tough to market abroad if the entire peninsula is a 
war zone.  In addition, war would obliterate South Korea’s goal of becoming a top ten 
economic power.  How many chemical Scuds into Seoul could the U.S.-ROK alliance 
absorb before the political military relationship changed significantly?  The answer is 
very few. 
 
                                                 
total trade volume is with China, it totaled only $1.05 billion.135    
2. Japan 
Even though Japan would be the only regional partner not to oppos
force, it is not eager to consider its use.  Japan, in range of North Korean ballistic m
and clandestine special-forces insertions, is the likely target in a North Korean attem
divide the Japanese-U.S. alliance.  Based upon decades of mistrust and
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In June of 1994, South Korea conducted a large-scale civil defense exercise in the 
event the nuclear crisis led to war.  As a result, in the two days following the 13 June 
1994 exercise announcement, the Seoul stock market dropped 25 percent.136  In any
future conflict, Northeast Asia could expect catastrophic stock market drops across the 
region, home to approximately one-half of the world’s economic output.  Following the
direct costs of combat operations, the United States would likely have to shoulder a 
significant portion of the cost of rebuilding Korea’s infrastructure, both North and South. 
Assuming the cost of Korean reconstruction would be at least as much if not more than 
the cost of reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, this figure could exceed the $87 
billion authorized by Congress in early 2004.   
2. Lives 
On 19 May 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry, along with U.S. Army Generals 




situation building on the Korean peninsula.  Regarding the meeting, Oberdorfer wrote:   
If war broke out…they estimated it would cost 52,000 U.S. military 
casualties, killed or wounded, and 490,000 South Korean military 
casualties in the first ninety days, plus an enormous number of North 
Korean and civilian lives, at a financial outlay exceeding $61 billion, very 
little of which could be recouped from U.S. allies.137 
The casualty predictions did not improve following the first ninety days.  During 
coercive diplomacy planning, Secretary Perry asked General Luck to estimate the damage 
of a full-scale war on the peninsula.  According to Oberdorfer, General Luck, a veteran of 
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Due to the lethality of modern weapons and Korea’s urban environment, 
as many as one million people would be killed, including 80,000 to 
100,000 Americans, that out-of-pocket costs to the United States would 
exceed $100 billion and the destruction of property and interruption to 
business activity would cost more than one trillion dollars to the countries 
involved and their immediate neighbors.138  
However, the lethality of modern weapons and the U.S. military’s ability to limit 
collateral damage has caused some military experts such as retired Air Force Lieutenant 
General Thomas McInerney to argue that although a second Korean war would cause 
significant damage, it would not be nearly as bad as some experts predict.  In an August 
2003 Wall Street Journal opinion article, former Central Intelligence Agency Director 
James Woolsey and retired Lieutenant General McInerney proposed that military force is 
a viable option for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis and that, in fact, “North 
Korea could be defeated decisively in thirty to sixty days.”139  They proposed that the 
much-discussed 11,000 artillery pieces, of which half can target Seoul, could be 
destroyed or sealed in their hardened facilities with the combination of stealth and 
precision-guided munitions.  Citing the available infrastructure in Northeast Asia and the 
access to North Korean targets from the sea, they view airpower as decisive with the 
possibility of generating and employing, “around 4,000 sorties a day compared to 800 a 
day that were so effective in Iraq.”140  In addition, the threat of Marine Corps amphibious 
assault on both coasts of North Korea could place both Pyongyang and Wonsan at risk of 
rapid seizure, especially since North Korea’s army mainly rests along the demilitarized 
zone.141 
Recently, changes have occurred in both U.S. military assets on the peninsula and 
the strategy by which to engage North Korean troops.  According to an April 2004 
Aviation Week & Space Technology article, U.S. military planners in Korea are 
attempting to take advantage of improved assets such as AH-64D Apache Longbow 
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helicopters, GPS-guided munitions, Shadow 200 unmanned aircraft, and PAC-3 ballistic 
missile interceptors.142  The current Seventh Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General 
He went on to indicate that Korea “always has to be looked at differently” from 
operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, not only because of North Korea’s massive 
army, but also because North Korean artillery can, “rain havoc on a very large civilian 
population.”144    
Regardless of who is correct regarding the extent of damage a second Korean War 
would cause or how long a war would last, the United States cannot justify initiating a 
preemptive attack on North Korea under the current strategic situation, especially when 
South Korea and China are adamantly opposed to it.  If South Korea strongly opposed the 
use of military force, it could ultimately deny the use of South Korean infrastructure to 
conduct U.S. operations.  This would significantly hinder the U.S. ability to wage war 
against North Korea.  Although it is militarily possible for the United States to defeat 
North Korea without conducting combat operations from South Korea, it is politically 
impossible to do so without destroying the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
3. Risk: Will War Lead to a Limited Nuclear Exchange? 
An adversary’s threat perception of its opponent is a critical factor in selecting a 
course of action.  As such, U.S. actions need to account for North Korea’s heightened 
fear of U.S. military force used to resolve the current crisis.  According to a 10 January 
2003 KCNA statement, North Korea views the Bush administration as hostile toward the  
                                                
Trexler, who is responsible for planning and executing the air campaign in the Korean 
theater, commented: 
There is a shift happening.  The improved equipment gives us a capability 
to attack these enemy forces very quickly and prevent some of the mass 
casualties.143 
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country, singling it out for a possible preemptive attack, to include nuclear weapons.145  
If Kim Jong-il believes that U.S. military force is to be used to achieve regime change, 
why would he not use every weapon at his disposal to survive?   
In Inadvertent Escalation, Barry Posen provided keen insight into how large-scale 
conventional war in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union could have 
led to nuclear war.146  Fully developing the prospects for a nuclear exchange between 
North Korea and the United States is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, U.S. 
military force policy planning must factor in this prospect.  As scary as this prospect is, 
maybe Kim is rational enough not to fight to the death.  On 5 August 2000, a delegation 
of South Korean media executives dined with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, including Choe 
Hak Rae, then publisher of Hankyoreh Shinum, a newspaper that covered North Korea 
favorably.  Choe asked Kim why North Korea spent so much of its scarce resources on 
ballistic missiles instead of social programs.  Kim replied: 
The missiles cannot reach the United States and if I launch them, the U.S. 
would fire back thousands of missiles and we would not survive.  I know 
that very well, but I have to let them know I have missiles.  I am making 
them, because only then will the United States talk to me.147 
If both the context and content of this reported quote are accurate, it indicates that 
Kim may be rational enough to understand the cost benefit analysis of engaging the 
United States in military action.  It also supports the speculated blackmail, black market, 
or deterrence theories for North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.   
F. PRECEDENT 
U.S. willingness to pay the high cost of war sends the strongest possible indicator 
of political resolve.  If U.S. leaders (the President, with adequate support from Congress) 
determine that North Korean nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated, the diplomatic stakes 
are tremendous.  There is more at stake than the status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons.  
If the United States was willing to invade Iraq yet avoids military conflict with North 
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Korea, other countries may conclude that nuclear weapons are the key to deterring U.S. 
ilitary action.  One potential benefit of the Iraq war may be that henceforth, a U.S. 
ilitary force is credible enough to convince North Korea to acquiesce.  Other 
potential benefits are lessons re-learned in verifying intelligence reports and the difficulty 
 building democracies to fill the void caused by regime change.     
G. SUMMARY 
Stand-alone, limited military operations against North Korea cannot achieve U.S. 
policy objectives.  Regardless of technological advances in stealth, effects-based 
targeting, and precision-guided munitions, a second Korean War will be protracted, 
costly, and devastating.  As to the quality of the weapons advantage that the U.S.-ROK 
 enjoys over North Korea, remember Stalin’s comment to Lenin regarding tanks, 
as a quality all its own.”  No matter how much “shock and awe” rains down 
illion-man North Korean army, they are dug-in, well trained, and capable of 
unleashing a tremendous volume of fire upon Seoul.  Under the current situation, none of 
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of the widespread destruction it would cause.  Unfortunately, it also has the greatest 
chance of achieving the stated objective of completely, verifiably, and irreversibly 








North Korea remains an enigma and the multilateral approach is both a blessing 
and a curse.  The blessing comes from possible increased pressure on North Korea to 
comply with regional demands for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis.  The curse 
is in the fact that with incentives likely to fail, a multilateral coercive approach or military 
force in the current strategic situation has little hope of success due primarily to a lack of 
regional support.  Herein lays the policy challenge; if North Korea cannot be enticed, 
coerced, or clubbed over the head, how should the United States proceed?  This chapter 
provides a summary of research findings and offers U.S. policy recommendations for 
North Korean nuclear weapons.  
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. The Carrot: Not Tasty Enough  
The Agreed Framework was the best of only bad options available in 1994; and it 
failed to remove North Korea’s incentive to develop nuclear weapons or to permit 
significant increases in transparency.  A similar approach in the current situation is 
unlikely due to the current administration’s predominant belief that North Korea cannot 
be trusted.  Moreover, North Korea has repeatedly balked at permitting increased levels 
of inspections regardless of the nationality of the inspectors or the organization they 
represent.  North Korea’s refusal to accept U.S. demands for increased transparency, and 
the requisite inspections, is the primary reason diplomacy will most likely fail to disarm a 
nuclear North Korea.  An incentive-based solution would be the least expensive in the 
long-term and has the greatest regional support.  However, incentive-based diplomacy 
will not entice North Korea to surrender the nuclear weapons in which it has invested so 
heavily and views as the penultimate deterrent to U.S. military force and the source of 
achieving “great power status.”   
2. The Stick: Too Many Hands, Wrong Target 
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With its low success rate, coercive diplomacy lacks the regional support necessary 
to conduct multilateral coercion successfully.  In addition, coercion would affect the 
wrong target and has the same transparency problems as incentive-based diplomacy.  
North Korean leaders are hyper-insulated from an already suffering population.  Virtually 
cutoff from all economic interaction with the United States, North Korea continues to 
receive reliable assistance from China and bilateral trade with South Korea.  Unless 
North Korea provokes the regional powers or increases tension with brinkmanship, it is 
unlikely that China and South Korea would support cutting North Korea off 
economically, thus limiting the United States’ ability to strangle North Korea.    
3. The Sledgehammer: Potentially Effective, but Blunt and Expensive 
Major military operations taken against North Korea, i.e. a second Korean War, is 
the policy most capable of achieving North Korean nuclear disarmament.  Unfortunately, 
it is also the most costly, lacks regional support, and places the U.S.-ROK alliance at risk 
of collapse.  A second Korean War also implies North Korean regime change, generates 
several negative consequences, and risks a limited nuclear exchange.  The list of 
obstacles to the use of military force is long.  A lack of regional support to discuss, let 
alone use military force, international blowback from Iraqi pre-war intelligence failures 
and perceived U.S. unilateral preemptive war, U.S. domestic concerns with the cost of 
Iraqi reconstruction, and the assured destruction of Korea’s infrastructure, removes it as a 
feasible U.S. policy option at the present time.  However, a credible threat of force is 
crucial to successful coercive diplomacy.  Moreover, the United States must still be 
politically and militarily ready to execute its threat if North Korea calls the bluff.   
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. What Price is the United States Willing to Pay? 
Anyone making policy recommendations for North Korea should remember the 
saying, “Anyone who claims to be an expert on North Korea is either a liar or a fool.”  
The United States successfully took the first step by achieving regional agreement for its 
policy objective: complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean nuclear 
disarmament.  The next most important step for U.S. policymakers is to answer the 
second question Richard Armitage’s working group asked in 1999, “What price is the 
United States willing to pay to disarm North Korea?”148  If the answer to this question 
does not include options on the far right end of the spectrum of influence (Figure 1) then 
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the United States should not pursue coercive diplomacy.  Coercive diplomacy assumes a 
credible threat of military force, sometimes combined with incentives, to achieve political 
objectives.  To threaten North Korea with the use of military force, either limited strikes, 
or major combat operations, and then not follow through would be worse than simply 
accepting a nuclear North Korea and continuing deterrence.  If a second Korean War is 
rejected as an acceptable policy to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons and incentive 
based diplomacy fails, the United States should attempt to mitigate further nuclear 
proliferation in Northeast Asia while continuing to deter North Korea from invading the 
South.  Although inexpensive in the near term, accepting a nuclear-armed North Korea 
simply postpones a difficult decision that will be more costly to resolve in the future and 
places U.S. vital interests in Northeast Asia at an unacceptably high level of risk in the 
present.   
2. Shift to Coercive Diplomacy and Prepare for War 
Each policy option alone will fail to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons.  
Currently, the only politically feasible alternative is the judicious use of just enough stick 
to convince North Korea to take the carrots offered before the deal expires.  However, 
time is on the side of North Korea.  North Korea can work quietly while observing the 
recent South Korean opposition party’s success in the April elections and the upcoming 
U.S. presidential elections in November 2004.  With each passing day, allows North 
Korea to pursue nuclear weapons without international inspections, providing it the 
opportunity to build an even greater deterrent.   
The United States must convince China and South Korea that disarming North 
Korea is a vital interest to not only the United States, but also Northeast Asia and that if 
not addressed soon, nuclear proliferation throughout Asia will become the world’s 
concern.  The six party talks should not continue indefinitely without tangible results.  A 
tightly held meeting followed Vice President Cheney’s April 2004 visit to Northeast Asia 
and Beijing closely between Kim Jong-il and Chinese leaders, including President Jintao.  
The South Korean press reported that China stressed the importance of continuing the 
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six-party talks and that Kim Jong-il should be more flexible in negotiating with the 
United States.149  An allegation also circulates that China gave North Korea economic 
assistance for simply traveling to Beijing and publicly stating that it would continue 
meaningful dialogue at the six party talks.  Multilateral diplomacy is the proper path, but 
it should be walked briskly in order to determine its chance for success without allowing 
North Korea unlimited time to build more nuclear weapons. 
Regardless of the outcome of the November 2004 Presidential election, the next 
administration should decide if it wants to shift from talks to coercion.  It is vital that this 
critical foreign policy decision be thoroughly vetted with a wide range of experts, inputs, 
and policy options, including a review of the Perry Report and Armitage 
recommendations.  Aggressive U.S. policy in Northeast Asia could easily escalate to a 
second Korean War and as a result, it is necessary to measure both Congressional and 
public support.  If Congress and the American people believe North Korean nuclear 
weapons are a threat to U.S. vital interests, then they should realize the policy’s potential 
costs.  Whatever the policy debate outcome, a clear and credible policy should be ready 
for implementation immediately following the Presidential election, since delays favor 
North Korea.  If the decision is to pursue coercive diplomacy, the next step is to reaffirm 
precisely what to demand of North Korea.   
Due to consensus with regional partners, it is likely the United States will 
continue to demand North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear 
disarmament, and not publicly advocate North Korean regime change.  The next step 
would be to develop and communicate a credible threat based upon realistic military 
capabilities within the constraints of very limited regional support.  For example, in order 
to conduct operations from Japan in preparation for limited South Korean support it is 
necessary to draft contingency plans.  Actual force deployments into the region, similar 
to Pacific Theater buildups prior to operations in Iraq to deter North Korean opportunistic 
aggression, must back the threat of military force.  However, the timing and extent of 
regional force buildup to support a threat requires careful  
Operations in Iraq placed a tremendous strain on U.S. forces, military logistics, and 
                                                
 planning and execution. 
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public support.  For example, U.S. troops stationed in Korea are planned to deploy to 
Iraq.  Likewise, increasing troop strengths in the Korean Theater heightens tension not 
only with North Korea, but also South Korea, China, and to some extent Japan.  
However, if properly executed, these buildups could accomplish three objectives.  First, 
they would support the threat of using force.  Second, they would be better prepared to 
conduct combat operations either to demonstrate U.S. resolve or to counteract North 
Korean aggression.  Finally, their redeployment out of the theater becomes bargaining 
chips for U.S. policymakers negotiating the details of any potential agreement.   
In communicating the threat of military action to North Korea, the United States 
should invite as many senior North Korean leaders as possible to review U.S. capabilities 
in South Korea and force demonstrations in the United States.  The purpose of these 
displays would be to demonstrate clearly that the threat of U.S. military force is credible.  
Furthermore, that U.S. forces employed on the Korean peninsula would be 
overwhelming, lethal, precise, and victorious.  The format for these military 
demonstrations could be similar to Air Power Demonstrations previously conducted near 
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada for high-ranking U.S. leaders such as members of 
Congress and all new flag rank officers in the U.S. military.  
After communicating a credible threat, the United States should offer incentives 
that allay North Korea’s fears and meet its dire energy and food needs.  Providing 
incentives, that some refer to as an “exit ramp,” allows Kim Jong-il a face-saving way out 
of his nuclear dilemma.  This is especially important when dealing with an insecure 
leader of a failed state who aspires to be a “great power,” especially when Korean culture 
places great emphasis on pride.  Although President Bush has stated he will not permit 
America to be blackmailed, when faced with either a second Korean War or accepting a 
nuclear North Korea, providing incentives may appear easier to swallow when offered 
after the threat of force.  Future incentive decisions should consider the pros and cons of 
continuing construction of the 1994 Agreed Framework’s two light water reactors or 
scrapping these programs for alternative energy sources.  Since North Korea objected to 
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South Korean workers being permitted inside North Korea to build the light water 
reactors, China could potentially assist North Korea in rebuilding its electrical  
infrastructure or an alternative energy source using South Korean and Japanese funding.  
Finally, the United States must determine a deadline for North Korea’s compliance and 
be militarily and politically prepared to execute its declared threat.   
U.S. policy will need to be “sold” both internationally and domestically.  Absent a 
significant threat, the average American largely ignores U.S. foreign policy.  The war in 
Iraq increased concern over intelligence accuracy and the viability of preemptive wars in 
pursuit of the “Axis of Evil.”  United Nations support for either coercion or military force 
to disarm North Korea will be more difficult to sell than the failed attempt to rally 
support for the Iraq War.  A Chinese veto of any proposed resolutions condemning North 
Korea or a call for an aggressive policy that it does not support is almost a certainty.  
Domestically, building support for a potential second Korean war would be difficult at 
best.  The average American has little interest in foreign policy and does not perceive 
North Korea as a threat to Homeland Security.  If a North Korean nuclear weapon sold to 
Al Queda and detonated at the Superbowl had Kim Jong-il’s fingerprints on it, America 
would mobilize.  Short of that, many Americans wonder why the United States should 
risk killing tens of thousands of people to remove a threat that young South Koreans fail 
to perceive.  It is necessary to use credible evidence of North Korea’s record of illicit 
activities and human rights violations to inform the American people and the 
international community of the repressive nature of Kim Jong-il’s regime.  Although 
Iraqi pre-war intelligence tarnished the United States’ reputation, it must pursue 
international and domestic support by convincing people that North Korea does, in fact, 
have nuclear weapons and that this is unacceptable.        
If both incentive and coercive diplomacy fail to disarm North Korean nuclear 
weapons, the steps taken during coercive diplomacy will better position the United States 
to conduct military operations at the time and place of its choosing to disarm North 
Korea.  Ideally, this would occur with at least South Korea’s tacit support and China’s 
promise to remain neutral.  However, military planners should prepare for the worst, and 
have contingency plans that assume no permitted offensive operations from South Korea 
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and that China could possibly provide North Korea limited assistance short of military 
force.  Among the myriad of considerations, strategists should avoid creating situations 
that are likely to trigger North Korean employment of nuclear weapons and how best to 
convince senior North Korean military leaders that the outcome of war is not the 
question, but rather how much destruction they wish to endure.  Psychological operations 
always play a role in military conflict, but the potential impact of exposing Kim Jong-il’s 
leadership failures, repressive actions, and economic incompetence could convince North 
Korean military leaders that the Libyan model is a better alternative than Iraq.   
The two alternatives available if diplomacy fails are both unattractive.  The 
United States, however, should not shy away from protecting its vital interests because a 
potentially effective policy is costly.  If after being informed of the potential costs of 
military force, Congress and the American people still support the U.S. objective of 
complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean nuclear disarmament, the United 
States should act immediately.  In addition, U.S. diplomats should make every effort to 
convince our regional partners that the benefits of supporting U.S. and regional policy 
goals outweigh the costs of opposing them.  At the end of the day, containing a nuclear-
armed North Korea is better than a second Korean War.  Of course, policy makers want 
to avoid having to present the President with this stark choice.  But if diplomacy fails to 
disarm a nuclear North Korea, advisers must be clear which of the two choices is 
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APPENDIX.  TIMELINE OF MAJOR NORTH KOREAN EVENTS 
Date Event Notes
1910-45 Japanese Colonization of Korean Peninsula
15-Apr-12 Kim Il Sung born w/diff name took name of nK guerilla fighter
1934? Kim Il Sung joins Chinese Communist Party
1935? Kim Il Sung Russia Red army major 
16-Feb-42 Kim Jong-il born in Soviet Military Camp vice Mt Pektu story No rainbows, no warm weather etc…..
10-Aug-45 Arbitrary line drawn at 38th parallel to divide division of labor w/ USSR.  Lt Col Rusk drew the line became Sec State Rusk
15-Aug-45 End Japanese Colonization of Korean Peninsula
15-Aug-48 Republic of South Korea (ROK) formed after UN observed democratic elections.  Syngman Rhee, 1st president
Sep-48 DPRK --Communits North Korea formed Stalin reported to have personally selected Kim il Sung
Nov-48 DPRK starts Guerilla warfare in Southern South Korea
Dec-48 Russia withdraws from Northern Korea
Jun-49 US withdraws from South Korea 
May-50 DPRK's guerilla war in South is suppressed
25-Jun-50 Start Conventional Korean War (Guerrilla war failed)
Mar-53 Stalin Dies
8-Jul-53 Armistice Signed at Panmunjom at 1400 not effective until later
27-Jul-53 Armistice becomes effective thus ending Korea War 33,629 US KIA + 20,617 U.S. killed other 103,284 wounded
Feb-58 DPRK agents hijack KAL Flight 28 pax held until early March Flt from Pusan to Seoul, landed Pyongyang 2 americans
1958- US places nuclear tipped rockets in South Korea Soviets help training & funding young DPRK nuclear prgrm
Apr-65 2 DPRK Migs attack/damage US RB-47 in sea of Japan 50 miles from DPRK coastline
1965- DPRK gets its first 2MW reactor from USSR Yongbyon small research reactor
Late '67 US preoccupied with Vietnam war escalation and siege of US Marine Garrison at Khe Sanh
21-Jan-68 DPRK agents attack ROK Presidential Blue House 31 agents get w/in 1/2 mile of Pres Park, 29 of em killed
23-Jan-68 USS Pueblo siezed by DRPK 83 crew, held 1 day shy of 11 months, 1 died of injuries
30-Jan-68 North Vietnamese TET Offensive begins with attack on US Embassy in Saigon
1-Jul-68 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Signed by creators NA for DPRK & ROK
Oct-68 130 Sea-born DPRK commandos attempt landing near Samchok & Ulchin areas
22-Dec-68 USS Pueblo crew released nK demands we sign spying admission
14-Apr-69 DPRK shoots down US navy EC-121 recon plane 31 dead, aircraft was 90nm off-shore
17-Aug-69 US H-23 Helo lost & shot down north of DMZ 3 crew released 3 Dec 69
Oct-69 4 US KIA on south side of DMZ by DPRK ambush attack
3-Dec-69 3 crew of H-23 released
Dec-69 DPRK agents hijack ROK YS-11 flight to wonsan with 51 souls on board
5-Mar-70 NPT takes effect in 1995 voted to be indefinite NA for DPRK & ROK at this time
Nov-70 DPRK infiltrator plants bomb Seoul National Cemetery Attempt on ROK Pres Park Chung Hee
1970- DPRK contests Western NLL with ROK 20-30 times per year, boats press then turn around
4-Jul-72 Historic North-South Joint Communique Cease slander, promote exchange
15-Aug-74 DPRK agents attempt to assasinate ROK Pres. Park, Chung Hee
at public function, Killed his wife.  Agent Mun Se-gwang tried, 
convicted & Executed by South Korea
Nov-74 1st DPRK Tunnel Below DMZ found
Mar-75 2nd DPRK Tunnel Below DMZ found
18-Aug-76 2 US officers clubbed to death over tree trimming one officer was Capt Bonifas, now Camp Bonifas on DMZ
21-Aug-76 Same tree cut down by Sig US show of force No opposition by DPRK
14-Jul-77 US CH-47 Shot down north sector of Eastern DMZ Crew was lost and resulted in 3 US dead
Feb-78 ROK movie star Ms Cha kidnapped by DPRK agents Kim il Sung's whim, escaped in 1986 
Oct-78 3rd DPRK Tunnel Found estimated throughput of 30,000 troops per hour
1977-1983 DPRK Kidnaps multiple Japanese citizens to have role models for training DPRK agents for infiltration into Japan
26-Aug-81 nK SA-2 launches at US SR-71 recon plane Site: Chokta-Ri n. shore of Han River
1983? nK Mig-19 Defect to South
9-Oct-83
DPRK 3-man team attempt assasinate ROK President Chun Doo 
Hwan in Rangoon Burma, but remote bomb premature detonate
Kills 17 senior ROK officials and injured 14, two suspects 
arrested: DPRK Army major Zin Mo & Capt Kang Min Chol
1984-1985 DPRK's 5MW reactor completed in Yongbyon Late 1985 will join NPT but fails to allow monitor
Nov-84 Pres Kim Il Sung praises ROK for accept flood aid Aid was from North to South
15-Nov-84 1st Inter Korean Economic Cooperation Mtg To discuss potential trade between N/S
23-Nov-84 DMZ firefight over nK soviet defector to south
27-Nov-84 DPRK cancels economic talk w/ROK due to DMZ
20-Jun-85 3rd Session of N-S Economic talks Agree to establish  economic cooperation body @ deputy PM level  
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Date Event Notes
12-Dec-85 DPRK joins NPT under Soviet pressure, treaty requires compliance within 180 days = 12 Jun 86, not done til April '92
7-Oct-87 DPRK sinks ROK fishing vessel 100 Ton ship 11 ROK dead
29-Nov-87 KAL 858 bombing flight Bagdad to Seoul, nK in Bahrain 115 killed, DPRK agent caught & confesses
Jan-88 US Secretary of State basically declares DPRK supporter of International Terrorism
Sep-88 Seoul Olympics (nK demanded joint host, IOC denied)
Mar-90 4th DPRK Tunnel Found under DMZ
04-Sep-90 First High level North South Talks
Aug-91 Failed coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev Accelerated disolution of Soviet Union, leads to 27 Sep..
17-Sep-91 ROK & DPRK Join United Nations
27-Sep-91 Bush Senior agrees to withdraw tactical nukes from Peninsu DPRK accepts inspections of nuclear facilities May 92
13-Dec-91 DPRK & ROK sign "Basic Agreement" on Reconciliation Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation
31-Dec-91 DPRK & ROK sign Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula establishing the JNCC
07-Jan-92 ROK defense minister announces suspension of Team Spirit large US-ROK military exercise that scares DRPK
30-Jan-92 IAEA & DPRK sign nuclear safeguards agreement enters into force on 10 April 92
18-21 Feb 926th N-S high level talks Joint Declaration on De-Nuclear De-Nuclearization of Peninsula takes effec
25-Feb-92 CIA Director Robert Gates tells House Foreign Affairs Cmte DPRK "a few months from having nuclear weapon"
11-16May '92Hans Blix leads IAEA inspection to Yongbyon learns that large plutonium sep plant & had already done some
08-Oct-92 US & ROK announce resumption of Team Spirit in Mar 93
Oct-92 ROK busts 400 member North Korean spy ring in South Korea
In 1992 Unconfirmed DPRK Coup attempt as reported by defector in 95
Early 93 Last meeting of the JNCC, not sure of exact date yet
Jan-93 DPRK twice refuses to permit IAEA inspectors in
25-Jan-93 Angry over Refusal, US & ROK announce resumption of Team Spirit Exercise
9-Feb-93 IAEA for first time calls for "special inspections" in DPRK to investigate discrepancies found 
9-Mar-93 Team Spirit Military Exercise restarted (50K US & 70K ROK troops) US-ROK exercise that was suspended in Jan 92
9-Mar-93 DPRK informs the UN Security Council they are in a "state of semi-war" due to Team Spirit Exercise 
12-Mar-93 DPRK announces it is withdrawing from NPT under article X 3 months notice due to supreme national interests
1-Apr-93 IAEA adopts resolution that DPRK is in non-compliance
Jun '93 DPRK suspends its withdrawal from NPT days before going into effect, claims "special status" for next year!
19-Mar-94 DPRK comment at JSA "Seoul is not far from here, if war broke out, Seoul will be a sea of fire"
Apr '94 DPRK announces it shutdown 5MW reactor to refuel the core to begin as early as 4 May '94
12-May-94 DPRK informs IAEA it had already started unloading reactor Allows monitoring but no selection or measuring of rods
27-May-94 Hans Blix letter to UN Security Council stating, "fuel discharge operations are preceeding at a very fast rate which was ..
May-94 DPRK test fires 2 x silkworm anti-ship missiles
3-Jun-94 US announed breaking off bilateral talks w/DPRK and moving to impose UN Security Council sanctions against DPRK
10-Jun-94 IAEA suspended $250,000 in technical aid to DPRK DPRK formally withdrawls from IAEA, no impact to NPT
10-Jun-94 Carter briefed by NSA Anthony Lake "no authority to speak for the US" 
16-Jun-94 US NSC meets w/Clinton to discuss war plans Ashton Carter Asst sec def, "2nd cuban missile crisis"
16-Jun-94 Former President Carter breakthrough w/DPRK
22-Jun-94 Pres Clinton announced that DPRK had agreed to "freeze" its nuclear program
7-Jul-94 Formal talks begin to draft Agreed Framework
8-Jul-94 Kim Il Sung dies of heartattack Age 82, ruled since 1948 "Great Leader" son is "Dear Leader"
25-Jul-94 Scheduled but not accomplished NS Presidential talks Due to KIS death
21-Oct-94 Agreed Framework Signed
Sep-95 DPRK defector Lt Col Choe Jo Hwal
Oct-95 DMZ firefight kills 3 DPRK 800m south of DMZ
Oct-95 DPRK agent caught in ROK, shootout for partner in Puyo ROK police killed in shootout w/nK agents
1996? DPRK Mig-19 Defect to South
10-Sep-96 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Sep-96 DPRK Sub found off ROK SE coast shootout killed 24 nK and 11 SK
Oct-96 ROK Diplomat bludgeoned to death in Vladivostok followed DPRK retaliatory threats, poison matched DPRK
12-Feb-97 DPRK Hwang Jang Yop defects via SK consulate Bejing
Once a tutor to KJI, Highest ranking nK to defect 1/12 of nK 
highest ranking decicsion body, Founder of Juche
15-Feb-97 DRPK defector Lee Han Young shot/killed in  South Korea Nephew of KJI ex-wife Sung Hae-Rim, nK agents killed him
8-Oct-97 Kim Jong-il elected General Secretary of Workers Party "Dear Leader" father was "Great leader"
22-Jun-98 DPRK midget Sub caught in ROK fishing nets 9 crew members apparent suicide
31-Aug-98 DPRK test fire 3-stage Taepodong 1 over Japan Now have 1,000nm missile capability, 2 stages worked
18-Dec-98 ROK sinks DPRK Speedboat near Yosu 1 nK body in H2O nK agent insertion/extraction at night
20-22 May 99US State Department visit to DPRK Find out more on this one
8-Jun-99 Start of N-S Crab fishing area dispute
15-Jun-99 ROK DEFCON 3 sank DPRK torpedoboat (Soviet P-6)  
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Date Event Notes
Sep-99 DPRK declares armistice western NLL "Invalid" will use force contested since 1970's
1-Jan-00 U.S. Secretary of State Albright meets KJI in Pyonyang
20-Jan-00 President George Bush Inauguration
13-15 Jun 00 First North South Historic Summitt
11-Sep-01 World Trade Centers & Pentagon Attacked in US NA wrt to DPRK, but will impact US National Security Policy
17-Sep-01 KJI meets w/Japan's PM Koizumi and admis to kidnapping 11 Japanese citizens in 70's - 80's, 4 alive, 6 confirmed dead
22-Dec-01 Japan sinks nK drug running boat
30-Jan-02 Pres Bush State of Union calls DPRK, Iran, Iraq "Axis of evil"
"is a regime arming w/missiles & WMD while starving its 
citizens"
1-Jun-02 Seoul World Cup Soccer South Korean soccer team doing well 
29-Jun-02 DPRK sinks ROK Navy ship 6 dead?
17-Sep-02 President Bush signs new US National Security Policy
5-Oct-02 DPRK tells US envoy James Kelly it can do HEU  1,2,3…2,3 up to you: U.S. tells world on 17 Oct
14-Nov-02 US & KEDO agree to suspend HFO shipments to DPRK DPRK violated Agreed Framework
25-Nov-02 "Code of Conduct" Signed US +90 countries to limit ballistic missile proliferation--DPRK & + others do not sign
10-Dec-02 US intercepts ship in Arabian Sea w/12 nk Scuds
11-Dec-02 UN General Assembly Resolution 57/9 on 2001 IAEA report on N Korea noncompliance para 11
12-Dec-02 DPRK announces it will reactivate nuclear facilities 94 agreement null & void, need energy
19-Dec-02 New ROK President Roh Moo-Hyun elected
21-Dec-02 DPRK announces removal of seals and cameras at Ybyong
27-Dec-02 DPRK expels IAEA inspectors and plans to reactivate reproccesing facility
10-Jan-03 DPRK announces withdrawing from NPT based on last withdraw reqest, this one 1 day
28-Jan-03 Pres Bush State of Union calls DPRK "Outlaw state" DPRK, "Undisguised declaration of aggression"
Feb-03 nK anti-ship missile test yellow sea
12-Feb-03 IAEA declares DPRK in violation of NPT accords refers to UN Security Council
12-Feb-03 Last public appearance of Kim for 48 days he met with some visiting Russian officials, seen next on 3 April 03
18-Feb-03 DPRK threatens to withdraw from '53 Armistice agreements
20-Feb-03 nK Mig 19 violates airspace Last penetrat 1983 defection
24-Feb-03 nK anti-ship missile test yellow sea 1st test in 5 years, just hours before inaguartion ceremony
25-Feb-03 Inaguration of new sK Pres Roh Moo-hyun
26-Feb-03 US officials state DPRK restarted its 5MW reactor Yongbyon reactor
20-Mar-03 US war with Iraq starts
Mar-03 Kim Jong iI not seen in public (abnormal) "hiding" for 48 days Coincident with US start of war in Iraq (leadership targets)
2-Mar-03 DPRK MIG 29s & 23s intercept US RC-135S Last intcpt 1968 USN EC-121 shotdown
10-Mar-03 DPRK test fires second anti-ship missile in Sea of Japan First "recent one" was 24 Feb 03
15-Mar-03 PRC elects new President Hu Jintao born Dec '42 Jiang Zemin still controls central military Committee
3-Apr-03 Kim surfaces again publicly for a military ceremony Suspected hiding 48 days due to US war in Iraq
9-Apr-03 UN Security Council expresses concern about nuclear crisis but no condemnation of DPRK
10-Apr-03 DPRK NPT withdraw becomes effective due to required 3 month withdraw time required by treaty
12-Apr-03 German authorities sieze 214 aluminum tubes for DPRK 8'x9" alum. alloy 6061-T6 Nam Chon Gang
12-Apr-03 DPRK drops demand for bilateral only talks wants US to make "bold switchover" in its Korea policy
18-Apr-03 DPRK claims to have begun reproccessing the 8000 fuel rods for nuclear weapons
23-Apr-03 PRC hosts 3 days of 3 party talks, DPRK admits to US yes, nuclear weapons, submits "bold proposal"
25-Apr-03 James Kelly told DPRK has nuclear weapons over dinner Famous 1,2,3 things, 2,3 up to you….
14-May-03 Presidents Bush and Roh meet in Washington agree to "further steps" in dealing with DPRK
22-May-03 Bush meets Japan's Pres Junichiro Koizumi in Tx denounce DPRK nukes, possible "stronger measures"
31-May-03 Pres Bush Announces PSI: Proliferation Security Initiative 11 original countries Oct 03 added 5 more, agree on Int Prin
2-Jun-03 DPRK says almost complete reprocessing 8000 fuel rods according to US CODEL visit to Pyongyang
9-Jun-03 DPRK official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) admits to seeking nuclear weapons
27-Aug-03 6-Party talks held in Bejing PRC, US, DPRK, ROK, Japan, Russia
15-Jan-04 Semi official U.S. delegation allowed visit to Yongbyong
Siegfried Hecker, former Los Alamos director & Charles L. 
"Jack" Pritchard, previous special envoy to DPRK
25-Feb-04 Beijing hosts 2nd round of 6 party talks Little Progress made
12-Apr-04 Vice President Cheney visits Northeast Asia including Beijing
21-Apr-04 Kim Jong-il travels to Beijing to meet Chinese Leaders Meeting done quietly, not released until after the fact
21-Apr-04 Train explosion in Ryongchon station near China's border killed 54 injured 1249, phone lines shutoff to stop info flow
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